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ABSTRACT 
 
Kojève and Levinas: Universality without Totality. (May 2010) 
Anthony John Pepitone, B.A., University of Portland 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Theodore George 
 
 
I have structured my master’s thesis in terms of an opposition between Kojève’s 
existentialist, Marxist philosophical formulation of Hegel’s Phenomenology and 
Levinas’s post-Heideggerian, anti-Hegelian phenomenology in Totality and Infinity. 
While Levinas’s project is explicitly anti-totalitarian, Kojève’s reading of the 
Phenomenology emphasizes the End of History in Hegel’s philosophy without shrinking 
from its totalizing aspects. While the philosophical project of each thinker is generally 
antithetical to the other, it is my contention that the universal and homogeneous state, 
conceived by Kojève to be the rational realization of the end of history, is a legitimate 
moral project for Levinasian ethics.  
This thesis provides both an exegesis of Kojève’s reading of Hegel’s master/slave 
dialectic in the Phenomenology and an interpretation of the tragedy of the slave 
understood in terms of Hölderlin’s theory of the tragic. It is through the master/slave 
dialectic that history consummates in the end of history. Later in the thesis, I outline 
Levinas’s project as an ethics as first philosophy in opposition to the Eleatic traditions in 
Western philosophy. We can trace Levinas’s project in his unconventional reading of the 
cogito and the idea of infinity. Whereas Descartes represents a philosophical return home 
for Hegel, Levinas’s reading of Descartes represents a philosophical sojourn away from 
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home in the second movement of the Meditations. With these notions, we have a formal 
basis in accounting for the conflict in Levinas’s thought between the moral necessity of 
universal rights and the dangers of assimilation. Finally, I argue for why the universal and 
homogeneous state is an ethically worthy goal from a Levinasian perspective. On this 
question, I engage the thought of a number of thinkers of the left: Kojève, Derrida, 
Horkheimer, Adorno and Žižek.  
I conclude that Levinas’s thought on universalism and eschatology can serve as a 
moral basis for the left-Hegelian project of realizing a universal and homogeneous state. 
Because such a state is distinguishable from a totalizing End of History, the 
eschatological concern for one’s singularity within history is compatible with the 
prophetic call to strive for political universality. Ultimately, it is the responsibility to this 
prophetic call that guarantees one’s singularity.  
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CHAPTER I  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This thesis seeks to bring the thought of two original thinkers into 
correspondence. More narrowly, it is structured in terms of an opposition between 
Kojève’s existentialist, Marxist philosophical formulation of Hegel’s Phenomenology and 
Levinas’s post-Heideggerian, anti-Hegelian phenomenology in Totality and Infinity. 
While Levinas’s project is explicitly anti-totalitarian, Kojève’s reading of the 
Phenomenology emphasizes the End of History in Hegel’s philosophy without shrinking 
from its totalizing aspects. From this strange, if not impossible, philosophical encounter 
between Kojève and Levinas, it is my contention that the rational realization of the End 
of History in the universal and homogeneous state is a legitimate moral project for 
Levinasian ethics. In Chapter II, I show Kojève’s argument for the End of History and 
how the universal and homogeneous state follows. In Chapter III, I outline the form of 
Levinas’s ethics as first philosophy, and then endeavor to show how his ethics pertains to 
the politics of universalism. In Chapter IV, I present a number of arguments and readings 
that demonstrate how Levinasian ethics is consistent with the politics of a few thinkers of 
the left: Kojève, Derrida, Horkheimer, Adorno and Žižek.  
 With Chapter II, I present Kojève’s reading of the Hegelian master / slave 
dialectic as a tragedy. Starting with Descartes’ epistemology, Hegel begins with the 
cogito as the origin of modern philosophy where thought begins its return home to the  
mind. In Hölderlin’s theory of judgment, there is a rejection of the cogito in favor of the  
 
------------------------- 
This thesis follows the style of Research in Phenomenology.  
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ineffable intuition of undifferentiated being. It is this intuition that is conveyed through  
tragedy, in Hölderlin’s theory, where the tragic hero is annihilated in the tragedy’s 
presentation of undifferentiated totality. I argue that Hegel’s dialectic of self-
consciousness synthesizes Descartes’ epistemology with Hölderlin’s theory of judgment. 
Self-consciousness thus begins with the certainty of consciousness, but genuine self-
consciousness only comes about through the recognition of others. For consciousness to 
achieve self-consciousness, it begins with the desire for others’ desire (or pure prestige) 
and proceeds through a dialectic between master and slave. Through the slave’s 
transformation by way of labor and struggle against the master on fear of death, genuine 
self-consciousness emerges at the End of History when the slave overthrows the master 
and then assimilates into a homogeneous society of citizens without slave or master. This 
moment is presented by Kojève in the dramatic aftereffects of the French Revolution 
when Hegel wrote the Phenomenology and Napoleon engaged in the Battle of Jena.1 For 
Kojève, Napoleon represented the universal political expansion of the French Revolution, 
which would culminate in the universal and homogeneous state. In such a state of affairs, 
the singularity of the slave is annihilated in the totality of history through the process of 
self-consciousness’ supersession. 
 If Hegel’s philosophy of history is tragic, we can consider Levinas’s philosophy 
as anti-tragic. My reading of Levinas largely centers on his work Totality and Infinity, 
and seeks to describe, by way of exegesis, how the conflict in Levinas’s thought between 
the particular and the universal (for which religious and political identity in Levinas’s 
thought can respectively serve as shorthand) can be traced back to the conflict in identity 
inherent to one’s self-identity in the ethical relationship. For Levinas, the history of 
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philosophy after Plato is the history of reducing the other to the same. For the sake of a 
genuinely ethical relation, the other must be maintained against reduction to the same, 
and we can trace this project in Levinas’s unconventional reading of the cogito in 
Descartes. By focusing on the second movement of the cogito regarding the idea of the 
infinitely perfect being, Levinas develops out of Descartes’ thought an ethics as first 
philosophy. On this reading of Descartes, finitude is equated with the imperfection that 
desires the infinitude of perfection through the idea of the infinite. I argue that the 
relationship between the ego and the idea of the infinite offers a formal structure (similar 
to Plato’s divided line), which may serve as a basis for the deformalized relationship 
between the Self and Other. It can also serve as the basis for understanding the 
relationship between ethnic and national identity. This in turn will help put into relief 
questions about assimilation in the universal and homogeneous state. Nonetheless, so 
long as the End of History is generated from within history, history reserves the final 
judgment on the value and worth of individuals. Against this tragic conception of history, 
Levinas poses the eschatological as an anti-tragic order from which each individual’s 
worth and singularity is preserved by judgments that have their basis in an infinite time 
that exceeds history and its tragic totalization. 
In Chapter IV, I address the question of how Levinasian ethics is consistent with 
the project of a universal and homogeneous state. Whereas Descartes represents a 
philosophical return home for Hegel, Levinas’s reading of Descartes represents a 
philosophical sojourn away from home in the second movement of the Meditations. 
Similarly, a Levinasian could interpret Kojève’s conception of post-historicity as 
humanity’s sojourn away from itself. For example, in Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
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Dialectic of Enlightenment, Odysseus’ encounter with the Sirens serves as a metaphor for 
the self-imposed slavery of the masters in their blind use of instrumental reason. 
Emancipation shows itself as a sojourn with the wholly other Sirens who symbolize the 
infinitude of practical reason. Related to practical reason, Derrida outlined a reading of 
the Kojève’s End of History as an ethically necessary sojourn in the time of “the pure 
humanity of man, of the other man and of man as other.”2  From the standpoint of 
Levinasian ethics, we can interpret the universal and homogeneous state as the project for 
the systematic elimination of the need and dispossession of the stranger (i.e., those that 
stand behind the Other as a third party), by means of the universal rights to liberty, 
equality and fraternity. I finally address Žižek’s criticism of Levinas’s ethical thought, 
since this criticism stands in direct opposition to my thesis. While Žižek argues that love 
for the Other and justice for the third are structurally antithetical, I argue that Žižek 
neglects the aspect of infinity in Levinas’s thought, and this is the primary cause of his 
misreading Levinas. 
In the final analysis, there is a moral duty to realize the universal and 
homogeneous state to the extent that it realizes the prophetic call for universal rights. As 
distinct from the End of History, the universal and homogeneous state does not 
necessarily imply the dangers of total assimilation and de-diversification. Derrida shows 
how the work of justice is interminable, and this interminability preserves discourse. 
I have not tried to synthesize the thought of Kojève and Levinas, but I have 
instead highlighted the wide divergences in their thought. Descartes serves as a key point 
of reference for many of these divergences. Whereas Hegel adds to the cogito the desire 
for prestige in the anthropogenesis of human recognition, Levinas reads desire as integral 
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to Descartes’ project for understanding finitude in light of infinitely desirable perfection. 
This positive notion of infinity serves as the grounds for Levinas’s notion of eschatology, 
which preserves the singularity of the other from the tragic finality of history’s 
progression and conclusion.  
 
NOTES 
 
1
 Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit (Ithaca  
NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), 44. 
2
 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: the State of Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 74. 
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CHAPTER II  
KOJÈVE’S END OF HISTORY 
 
In this chapter, I will provide both an exegesis of Kojève’s reading of Hegel’s 
master/slave dialectic in the Phenomenology and an interpretation of the tragedy of the 
slave understood in terms of Hölderlin’s theory of the tragic. Within this dialectic, we can 
see the movement from the consciousness of the Cartesian subject to the self-
consciousness of a subject desirous of recognition in the synthesis of Hölderlin’s theory 
of tragedy and Descartes’ epistemology. Kojève’s commentary on Hegel’s master/slave 
dialectic highlights the role of death and work as the driving factors of the master/slave 
dialectic. In the slave’s absolute fear of death at the master’s hands, there is a realization 
that the natural world must be overcome. Through the slave’s slavery to the master, work 
is performed for the slave’s immediate pleasure and consumption, but the slave’s work of 
transforming the world also transforms the slave. In this transformation, the slave passes 
through slavery and overcomes the fear of death as well as her innate animal nature. 
Kojève’s depiction of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic is tragic to the extent that the 
singularity of the slave is superseded by the End of History, which brings the dialectic to 
a conclusion. In such a state of affairs, there is neither master nor slave but rather the 
supersession of the two at the End of History, here identified with the universal and 
homogeneous  state, where the “strictly particular, personal, individual value of each is 
recognized as such, in its very particularity, by all, by Universality incarnated in the State 
as such; and in which the universal value of the State is recognized and realized by the 
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Particular as such, by all the Particulars.”1 This outlines the anthropogenesis of self-
consciousness.  
It is difficult to summarize the entirety of Kojève’s Introduction because it is 
really an assembly of lectures. It can be said that this assembly of lectures offers a 
Marxist, existentialist reading of Hegel's Phenomenology. The whole of the Introduction 
reads Hegel's Phenomenology in terms of its internal structure with a particular focus on 
the first part (or the first four chapters) of Phenomenology2, which interprets both a 
totality (from an existentialist perspective that understands one's end as the organizing 
principle for one's possibilities) and a realism (from a dialectical materialist perspective) 
within the whole of the Phenomenology.  
While Kojève’s end-of-history thesis may be idiosyncratic in the sense that it less 
properly exegetical than propagandistic, it still provides both a materialist and a 
phenomenological context for Hegel’s Phenomenology. As we shall see, full self-
consciousness requires a certain, concrete state of affairs where one (such as Hegel) is 
afforded self-consciousness through recognition. Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel depicts 
him as a realist (= materialist); yet, Kojève’s own philosophy of Hegel could be described 
as idealist (= existentialist) in the following sense: 
Hegelian philosophy is not a truth in the proper sense of the term: it is less 
the adequate discursive revelation of a reality, than an idea or an ideal, that 
is to say, a “project” which is to be realized, and therefore proved true, 
through action. However, what is remarkable is that it is precisely because 
it is not yet true that this philosophy alone is capable of becoming true one 
day. For it alone says that truth is created in time out of error and that 
there are no “transcendent” criteria (whereas a theistic theory of necessity 
either has always been true, or is forever false). And that is why history 
will never refute Hegelianism, but will limit itself to choosing between its 
two opposed interpretations.3 
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All of normativity (i.e., the ideal) is neither relative to any given time or place 
(relativism) nor absolute beyond any time or place (absolutism). Instead, all morality is 
relative to the absolute end of history wherein the discourse of emancipation was 
determined by the time and place of the French Revolution in the Napoleonic Code and 
the Universal Rights of Man. It is from this set of historical circumstances where the 
opposing interpretations of Hegel (left and right Hegelianism) can be said to have its 
origin in the opposing political factions of the French Revolution. It was during the 
tumultuous time period “that we derive our most common as well as our most crude 
political metaphor. The [radical] Jacobin faction began to sit to the left of the president’s 
chair in the assembly, and the [moderate] Girondins to his right.”4 If all normativity has a 
political motivation in the events and the aftermath of the French Revolution, then ethics 
is reducible to politics. In Chapter III, it will be noted how Levinas objected to this 
reduction as an undesirable consequence of German idealism. For the time being, we can 
see how Kojève envisioned a universal and homogeneous state as the properly post-
historical outcome of the Left Hegelian interpretation of the End of History. Such a state 
is universal (or “nonexpandible”5) and homogeneous (“free from internal contradiction: 
from class strife, and so on”6) wherein slavery and mastery are superseded by citizenry.  
The realization of this discourse of emancipation in a universal and homogeneous 
state is not predestined, but its very possibility is itself a confirmation of Spirit’s 
historical agency in determining between the left or right Hegelian interpretation of the 
rightful ramifications of the end of history; however, it should be noted that there was a 
shift in Kojève’s thought regarding the timing of the End of History. In the cited passage 
above regarding the opposing interpretations of Hegelian philosophy, Kojève (such as 
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Marx) believed that the universal and homogeneous state was essentially synonymous 
with the End of History (on his left Hegelian interpretation) and therefore a future event. 
Kojève announced a change of opinion on this matter in the footnote added to the second 
edition of his Introduction (this footnote will become even more pertinent in Chapter IV). 
Namely, on his later interpretation of the Phenomenology, Kojève seems to downplay the 
idealist aspect of his reading of Hegel by arguing that Hegel was originally correct that 
the End of History occurred contemporaneously with the tumultuous historical events 
that surrounded Hegel’s writing of the Phenomenology; therefore, the universal and 
homogeneous  state was not essential to the End of History. As a consequence, however 
rational and worthwhile the universal and homogeneous  state remains, its significance is 
comparable to a dénouement of the climactic events of the French Revolution, “[S]o-
called world history since then has been the working out of less than world-historical 
fundamental details.”7 In Chapter IV, we will review Derrida’s reading of the ethical 
significance Kojève ascribed to the trends and conditions leading to the universal and 
homogeneous  state, but this chapter will focus on Kojève’s understanding of Hegel’s 
master / slave dialectic, and how it lead to the End of History.  
          The first two chapters of the Introduction give Hegel's master/slave narrative 
preeminence for the sake of developing this narrative into a grand narrative that brings an 
understanding of Spirit's struggle for self-consciousness throughout history's 
development and conclusion in the events of the French Revolution and the person of 
Napoleon. Kojève speaks of four irreducible premises that are necessary for that which is 
accomplished in Hegel’s Phenomenology: 
By accepting these four premises, we understand the possibility of a 
historical process, of a History, which is, in its totality, the history of the 
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Fights and the Work that finally ended in the wars of Napoleon and the 
table on which Hegel wrote the Phenomenology in order to understand 
both those wars and that table. Inversely, in order to explain the possibility 
of the Phenomenology, which is written on a table and which explains the 
wars of Napoleon, we must suppose the four premises mentioned.8  
 
Roughly, these four premises are as follows: 1) speech reveals Being, 2) desire 
transforms Being, 3) desire for non-Being liberates one from Being, and 4) for the sake of 
liberation through the non-Being of the other’s desire (i.e., recognition), the other must 
not be annihilated. Whereas the first premise concerns the bare consciousness of what can 
be articulated, the other three premises motivate the development of self-consciousness 
through desire. 
The first premise is pertinent to the consciousness of the Cartesian cogito in 
giving to one's self one's own world. In the articulated thought of the cogito, I think, 
speech reveals being, ergo sum. It is precisely this speech that discovers the given being 
of one’s own existence; otherwise, “There is no human existence without Consciousness . 
. . without revelation of Being by Speech.”9 Why is Speech necessary for Consciousness 
of Being? In a sense, Hegel addresses the possibility of intuitions without concepts. 
Whereas such intuitions were blind for Kant, Hegel provides arguments for the muteness 
of isolated intuitions as a reductio ad absurdum. In its place, Hegel offers a totally 
immanent “Hegelian Logic,” which Hyppolite provisionally defines as starting with:    
an identification of thought [speech] and the thing [being] thought. The 
thing, being, is not beyond thought, and thought is not a subjective 
reflection that would be alien to being . . . Human language, the Logos, is 
this reflection of being into itself which always leads back to being, which 
always closes back on itself indefinitely, without ever positing or 
postulating a transcendence distinct from this internal reflection, without 
ever positing a beyond which would not be reflected completely, or a 
reflection which (although mediating) would be alongside being.10 
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The reductio can be born out in the project of not only giving sight to intuitions without 
concepts (in the refusal to identify the intuited thing with the conceptual thought), but 
also tragic speech of the ineffable, as we shall see in Hölderlin. 
 One means for examining the divergent thought between Hegel and Hölderlin is 
through Descartes. Hegel writes in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy:  
Now we come for the first time to what is properly the philosophy of the 
modern world, and we begin it with Descartes. Here, we may say, we are 
at home and, like the sailor after a long voyage, we can at last shout ‘Land 
ho’. Descartes made a fresh start in every respect. The thinking or 
philosophizing, the thought and the formation of reason in modern times, 
begins with him. The principle in this new era is thinking, the thinking that 
proceeds from itself.11 
 
If it was Descartes that announced the homecoming of philosophy to the land of thought, 
we can say that Hegel and Hölderlin both seized upon Descartes’ discovery of the 
journey’s end, and then took philosophy in opposite directions. Hegel consummated the 
end of the journey by “hitting land” through a philosophy of self consciousness built 
upon consciousness and desire (as we will see shortly). Hölderlin, by contrast, reversed 
course seaward for the ineffable in a rejection of both the Cartesian consciousness of 
understanding and the philosophical destiny of “thinking that proceeds from itself.”  
 Hegel’s appreciation for Descartes was more than nominal: 
 
Hegel aligns the thematic purpose of the Phenomenology with the 
completion of the philosophical projects inaugurated by early modern 
figures such as Descartes . . . Although Hegel’s aspirations to complete the 
projects of his predecessors in modernity unfolds along a number of 
fronts, one of the crucial lines of his approach may be summed up as a 
wish to fulfill the promise of his predecessors’ interest in the mathesis 
universalis. Hegel, not unlike his predecessors in modernity, maintains a 
marked faith in our prospect to determine absolutely certain foundations of 
knowledge, and holds that the human subject stands at the center point of a 
universe that it is able entirely to comprehend, a power that, in earlier 
times, might have been reserved only for God . . . However, Hegel 
contends that his predecessors fail because they relied on inadequate 
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notions of systematicity and method . . .they misconstrue our cognitive 
powers as an instrument.12 
 
In making the mind out to be a “thinking thing,” Descartes reduces the mind to an 
instrument in some sense. One way in which the “Cartesian dualism” of the 
subject/object relation lends itself to instrumentality is through the reification of 
consciousness (hardly a controversial charge since it is Descartes who conceives of the 
mind as a thing). Adorno addresses this issue in his criticism of Descartes’ use of 
clearness as a methodological criterion:  
that would be suitable only for a static subject and a static object. It does 
so, no doubt, out of excessive zeal for the specialized activities of the 
individual disciplines, which establish their objects and their object 
domains without reflection . . . When consciousness does not conceive 
[individual items of knowledge] as pinned down and identified like things 
– photographable, as it were – it finds itself of necessity in conflict with 
the Cartesian ambition.13 
 
Cartesian reason is what Hegel refers to as sensuous certainty. Such certainty is sufficient 
for the immediate self-presence of the cogito, which poses the:   
"unity of that which feels and that which is felt." But this unity reveals 
itself as including an ineluctable multiplicity and as being a mediation of 
various "heres" and "nows." The thing, the unity of various properties and 
negation of their separation, is born for-us. The object and the I are no 
longer immediate but have become the former an extended thing and the 
latter a thinking thing.14 
 
If the reasoning of the cogito comes by way of sensuous certainty, then we have a key 
insight into the nature of the self consciousness it affords. Charles Taylor draws a 
contrast between the Cartesian mathesis universalis and the Hegelian mathesis universalis 
in the former’s linear understanding (associated with bad infinity and exemplified in the 
infinite extension of space) and the latter’s circular reasoning (associated with the good 
infinity of totality):  
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Because reality is a circle, which can only present itself in its true form as 
the result of a process of development, which process is itself seen as 
posited by what results from it, we can only present the truth about the 
absolute in a system. Science itself must be a circle which reflects and 
gives an adequate account of the linked levels of being which are essential 
to the whole . . . To try to express this philosophy in any one principle or 
proposition is inherently against its nature . . . The type of thought which 
underlies this form of science Hegel calls ‘reason’ (Vernunft); this is the 
thinking which follows reality in its contradictions, and therefore can see 
how each level turns into the next one. Reason in this sense is contrasted 
to understanding (Verstand) which is the habit common to most, of 
holding fast to the principle of identity.15 
 
Of course, for Descartes, the one self-evident proposition for the foundation of his 
mathesis universalis was the cogito. While the self-consciousness of the cogito affords 
some sense of self-identity, Hyppolite notes how the specific “I think” (of the cogito, for 
our purposes) could not lead to authentic self-consciousness of itself devoid of dialectical 
reason:  
Hegel undoubtedly does not presuppose self-consciousness, the equation 
"I = I" as Fichte did; rather, he uncovers it in the development of 
consciousness. But in order to follow him, we must admit the movement 
from the specific to the universal, which at the level of the I is the original 
identity of this I and the universal I, of an "I think" that transcends any 
specific "I think" and of the "specific I think" itself.16 
 
To be fair to Fichte, the I in his conception is more of a performative activity than a 
factual presupposition.17 Nonetheless, it is precisely the performative activity of the 
cogito that entails its ontological certainty and implicit self-identity. Proceeding by the 
way of understanding (Verstand), we can see how the cogito implies self-consciousness 
through the principle of self-identity implied by understanding; i.e., “I think; therefore, I 
am (I).”   
Hegel’s objection to Descartes’ foundation for knowledge would be that the self-
consciousness implied by the cogito would not be explicit. For genuine foundational 
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knowledge, self-consciousness must be not only explicit, but irreducible to any singular 
propositional certainty found along the endless, linear extension of understanding. In the 
self consciousness to the equation “I = I,” it seems that Descartes’ cogito implies self-
consciousness, if the principle of self-identity is indeed implied by way of understanding. 
If so, then Descartes’ foundationalism begins with the unity of thinking and being: “I 
think” = “I am.” Nonetheless, Hyppolite notes that this unity of understanding and being 
is merely opinion:   
Certainty’s subject seems to have for itself a privilege. It believes that it 
takes hold of an indivisible intuition of its being which is below language, 
but all the “I's” claim to have the same intuition. Their confrontation 
makes the claimed immediacy of their viewpoint disappear . . . This “I,” 
originary and original, is in its ground only a universal, since language 
states it. It is not unique insofar as it says “I”; it only believes itself to be 
unique. This unicity is an opinion. The "I" who intends itself as unique is 
really more of a “One” (On), who constitutes the abstract medium of 
experience, just as abstract being constituted the medium of the felt. Here 
the lived sublates language only in intention and not in fact. “The “I” is 
merely universal like ‘now,’ ‘here,’ or ‘this’ in general (PH §102). And 
this universal that language states is the poorest form of thought.18  
 
In the sense that bare intuition might have its own understanding, the mythically 
“originary and original” “I” that Hyppolite speaks of is the I capable of a genuinely tragic 
disposition as found in the beautiful soul, “[T]he spontaneously pure conscience turns 
from action to talk, to the expression in literature of its own inner convictions, but which 
it can never act out for fear of losing this sense of its purity and universality.”19 If Hegel 
ultimately finds the Cartesian understanding wanting for more, Hölderlin perhaps finds it 
wanting for less as an example of the beautiful soul. 
 In Hölderlin’s fragment “Being Judgement Possibility,” some ontological remarks 
are made that will be of direct relevance to his theory of the tragic. Hölderlin posits that 
“Being - expresses the combination of subject and object.”20 This undifferentiated unity 
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of being precedes any judgment of the I including the seemingly tautological principle of 
self identity, “When I say: I am I, then the subject (I) and the object (I) are not combined 
in such a way that no separation can take place without injuring the nature of what is to 
be separated; on the contrary, the I is only possible through the separation of the I from 
the I. How can I say: I! without self-consciousness?”21 Judgement is the originary 
rendering of being into subject and object.22 This rendering of judgment is only possible 
through the concept of possibility belonging to the understanding, which conceives of the 
possible as a differentiation of actuality; however, through perception and intuition, it is 
suggested that one may witness the undifferentiated being of actuality.23 In the self-
consciousness and self-identity that follows from the judgment of the cogito’s 
understanding, the possibility of thought proceeding from itself disqualifies the cogito as 
a means of combining subject and object. 
This valuation of intuition as a pre-conceptual grasping directly leads itself to 
paradox. On the one hand, one cannot say “I” without implying the identity of self-
consciousness; yet on the other hand, it is pre-judgmental intuition that is capable of 
perceiving (without concepts) the unified subject-and-object of absolute being preceding 
any principle of identity (between subject and object) determined through judgment. 
Therefore, the pre-judgmental, pre-conceptual intuition of absolute being is ineffable and 
incommunicable. Regardless, Hölderlin acknowledges that it is precisely paradox that 
allows us the keenest insight into ancient tragedy, “The significance of tragedy is most 
easily understood [begriffen] through paradox.”24 What is the sign by which we 
understand the paradox of tragedy? The sign is the meaning of the tragic hero fated for 
demise: 
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The sign is in itself meaningless, without power, but that which is original 
is straight out. For really the original can only appear in its weakness, but 
insofar as the sign in itself is posited as meaningless = 0, the original too, 
the hidden ground of everything in nature can represent itself. If nature 
genuinely represents itself in its weakest gift [Gabe], then, when [nature] 
presents itself in its strongest gift, the sign = 0.25  
 
We can summarize Hölderlin’s conception of the tragic as follows. While the self-
identity of I=I leads to the differentiation of the subject from object (where the subject = 
1, in some sense), the tragic hero = 0. The sign of the tragic (the tragic hero that = 0) 
contrasts with the totality of the undifferentiated One by virtue of the sign’s decimation 
and the diffusion of tragic significance where, “All is speech against speech which 
mutually negates itself.”26 The end of tragic drama is the paradox of giving voice to the 
ineffable intuition of absolute being where the nihilation of the mortal hero demonstrates 
its tragic difference from the totality of the immortal absolute.  
Hölderlin offers a resource that is as unique as it is impossible: a modern account 
of the pre-modern understanding of ancient tragedy. In Hölderlin’s absolute separation of 
being from identity, it would seem that the cathartic insight into being that one 
experiences through the reflection of tragic drama can only come from a theater of non-
identity or difference between the finite nullity of the hero and the infinite totality of the 
One. Hölderlin’s theory of tragic difference lends Hegel a necessary speculative resource 
for his dialectical project insofar as it is Hegel’s project to bring the tragic hero of 
difference within the circle of totality as a subject that conceptualizes the whole. In the 
sense of reason (Vernunft), Hegel can dialectically identify the identity of the Cartesian 
subject with the non-identity of the tragic hero in the subjective articulation of the 
undifferentiated unity of being (1 + 0 = One). More precisely, we can say that the 
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synthesis of the bad infinity of Cartesian understanding with the finitude of Hölderlin’s 
theory of the tragic results in the good infinity of circular totality.  
As mentioned above, the point where Hegel takes Descartes as a point of 
departure in the direction of thinking that proceeds from itself is precisely the point that 
the Hölderlin rejects in favor of the ineffable that proceeds from being itself. In Kojève’s 
words, “the point of departure for the Hegelian system is analogous to that point in pre-
Hegelian systems that leads necessarily to silence [or to contradictory discourse].”27 The 
manner in which Hegel conceptualizes the conclusion of history is through the 
consummation of thinking that proceeds from itself (the identity of speech and being 
through understanding) towards the ineffable that proceeds from being itself (the 
difference between speech and being in tragic reflection) in the recuperation of this 
ineffable or contradictory discourse. By way of bringing Descartes full circle, Hegel 
meets and recovers Hölderlin’s philosophy of the tragic conclusively, since Hölderlin’s 
philosophy of the tragic also begins with Descartes through the rejection of the Cartesian 
methodology of thought that proceeds from itself. 
Hölderlin provides a better sense of ancient tragedy than Hegel if we grant that 
Hölderlin was closer (and tragically so) to ancient tragedy than Hegel. Ancient tragedy is 
nonetheless necessary for understanding the Phenomenology’s end of history. Perhaps 
this is the poetry of Hölderlin’s madness: he witnessed the very tragic nature of ancient 
tragedy, its bounded temporality and dénouement in the end of history. Hölderlin could 
not accept the pastness of ancient tragedy and believed in the possibility of genuine 
tragedy in the future. In his nostalgia for the Greek immortals and despair of the Christian 
divinity of his contemporary age, we find in Hölderlin the beautiful soul par excellence, 
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as described by Taylor above. In the inaction of Hölderlin’s self exclusion from his 
contemporaries, we find the historical demonstration of Hegel’s reductio argument 
mentioned above. If Hölderlin’s isolated existence was in fact that of the beautiful soul in 
Hegel’s opinion, perhaps Hölderlin’s theory of the tragic would not have been possible 
apart from its origin in a beautiful soul. If Hegel’s philosophy is the final philosophy born 
of heroic effort, Hegel cannot cast himself as a tragic hero, since it is this:  
figure that best represents the forms our consciousness takes prior to our 
attainment of absolute knowledge, while we remain as it were only part 
way along the path of experience, . . . In contrast with the Hegelian figure 
of the final philosopher, this tragic hero of experience enjoys no complete 
speculative self-knowledge, but is instead subject time and again to 
encounters with phenomena that overthrow her sense of self and of the 
world, and reveal the finitude of her cognitive powers.28 
 
If this is granted, perhaps we may view Hölderlin as the tragic hero in the drama of 
Hegel’s final philosophy. In the final analysis, Hegel’s project requires that he synthesize 
both the Cartesian premise of articulate, subject-oriented consciousness as well as 
Hölderlin’s anti-Cartesian conception of ineffable and undifferentiated being.  
Within the purview of the Cartesian premise alone, the human existence 
consciousness affords through speech is necessary but insufficient for what constitutes 
genuine self-consciousness. Hyppolite notes:   
The complete unity of being and the knowledge of being will lead us 
either not to reach or to go beyond consciousness, which is characterized 
by the distinction between certainty and truth, between knowledge and 
essence. Beyond it lies absolute knowledge, in which being is 
simultaneously a knowledge of being.29  
 
The modern project for a mathesis universalis can only be secured through the reason 
(Vernunft) of explicit self-consciousness, and this path to self-consciousness (and its 
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bridging of the gap between Cartesian consciousness and the intuition of ineffable being) 
begins with desire:  
For Self-Consciousness, and hence philosophy, to exist, then, there must 
be in Man not only positive, passive contemplation, which merely reveals 
being, but also negating Desire, and hence Action that transforms the 
given being. The human I must be an I of Desire – that is, an active I, a 
negating I, an I that transforms Being and creates a new being by 
destroying the given being.30  
 
The self-conscious I absorbed in Being presupposes the bare consciousness that reveals 
Being in the first place, but it is only though desire that the I forms a negating relation to 
Being where consciousness can proceed to self-consciousness. 
 At this stage, we have only one of three premises concerning desire, and we do 
not yet have an authentic I with genuine self-consciousness. The “greedy emptiness”31 of 
the merely desirous I is shared between humans and animals:  
The animal raises itself above the Nature that is negated in its animal 
Desire only to fall back into it immediately by the satisfaction of this 
Desire. Accordingly, the Animal attains only Selbst-gefühl, Sentiment of 
self, but not Selbst-bewusstsein, Self-Consciousness – that is, it cannot 
speak of itself, it cannot say “I. . . .” And this is so because the Animal 
does not really transcend itself as given;32 
 
Hence, a second premise concerning desire is needed for genuine self-consciousness. The 
animal cannot transcend itself because of its solely dependent relation with given Being; 
however, “To desire non-Being is to liberate oneself from Being, to realize one’s 
autonomy, one’s Freedom.”33 It is within a social context that ethics and politics becomes 
possible, but in the early stages of human development (anthropogenesis), we find the 
beginning of history in the desire for prestige:    
the existence of several Desires that can desire one another mutually, each of 
which wants to negate, to assimilate, to make its own, to subjugate, the other 
Desire as Desire. This multiplicity of Desires is just as 'undeducible' as the fact of 
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Desire itself. By accepting it, one can already foresee, or understand ('deduce'), 
what human existence will be.34 
 
In this state of nature, there is a life and death struggle prompted by the desire for the 
other’s desire: one’s freedom in the desire for non-Being. Such a struggle is thwarted if 
the other perishes. The destruction of the other eliminates one’s possible freedom. This 
makes murder impossible for the advancement of self-consciousness, which results in the 
final premise concerning desire, "One must suppose that the Fight ends in such a way that 
both adversaries remain alive."35 
 By what circumstances in the life and death fight is it determined how one 
becomes either a master or slave? The master and slave both have a 2-fold desire: they 
both desire to not die (a negative desire) and they both desire to live (a positive desire for 
recognition – or the desire for the other’s symmetrical cognition of one’s own self): 
The vanquished has subordinated his human desire for Recognition to the 
biological desire to preserve his life: this is what determines and reveals – 
to him and to the victor – his inferiority. The victor has risked his life for a 
nonvital end: and this is what determines and reveals – to him and to the 
vanquished – his superiority over biological life and, consequently, over 
the vanquished. Thus, the difference between Master and Slave is realized 
in the existence of the victor and of the vanquished, and it is recognized by 
both of them.36 
 
The master sacrifices the desire to not die for the desire to live while the slave sacrifices 
the desire to live for the desire to not die. While it must be acknowledged that a more 
precise translation of the Hegelian term “Knecht” is “servant” rather than “slave” 
[Sklave]37, I believe that referring to this term as “slave” helps enhance the Hegelo-
Kojèvian point that that the master is, in his supreme alienation, bears no fundamental 
relation to the slave. The slave, on the other hand, does not work for the master (as any 
servant does) so much as for the master’s threat of death. Whereas a servant’s life may 
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retain an intrinsic value and entitlement for the master, the slave’s life holds no intrinsic 
value for the master. The slave is property or even a means of exchange for the master, 
and it is because of this fact that the slave cannot satiate the master’s desire for 
recognition.  
From the get-go, the slave is mastered by death as an absolute master, and it is 
this desire to not die which is, above all, productive. The master merely helps the slave 
realize the hostility of nature (wherein one can be annihilated if one does not fear death), 
and this transforms the slave into an agent of transformation where the slave becomes 
master of both herself and nature. The slave is forced to work on the threat of death 
according to the master’s instincts:  
But by acting to satisfy an instinct that is not my own, I am acting in 
relation to an idea, a nonbiological end. And it is this transformation of 
Nature in relation to a nonmaterial idea that is Work in the proper sense of 
the word: Work that creates a nonnatural, technical, humanized World 
adapted to the human Desire of a being that has demonstrated and realized 
its superiority to Nature by risking its life for the nonbiological end of 
Recognition.38 
 
For the slave’s transformation into a free citizen, two conditions are necessary. First, the 
slave must be in a state of absolute terror (as opposed to the mere fear of death).39 
Without absolute terror, the slave does not know the hostility of the natural world, and 
becomes merely a reformer or conformer rather than a revolutionary dedicated to the total 
transformation of the master and slave’s relationships to each other and to nature. 
Secondly, the slave’s labor must be "educative-forming [by work]."40 In the 
absence of work, terror will lead the slave to become "a madman or a criminal."41  If the 
two conditions are satisfied, the slave has a path for the transcendence of the world, 
which the master can never achieve:  
             22
Now, this revolutionary transformation of the World presupposes the 
'negation,' the non-accepting of the given World in its totality. And the 
origin of this absolute negation can only be the absolute dread inspired by 
the given World, or more precisely, by that which, or by him who, 
dominates this World, by the Master of this World.42 
 
The given, natural world is the master's world, and the master (along with the 
master/slave relationship) perishes because the slave’s ultimate work of transforming the 
world, “To be sure, this work by itself does not free him. But in transforming the World 
by this work, the Slave transforms himself, too, and thus creates the new objective 
conditions that permit him to take up once more the liberating Fight for recognition that 
he refused in the beginning for the fear of death.”43 Genuine self-consciousness is only 
possible after the transformation of the world at the end of history, “Now such a State, 
such a synthesis of Particularity and Universality, is possible only after the “overcoming” 
of the opposition between the Master and the Slave, since the synthesis of the Particular 
and the Universal is also a synthesis of Mastery and Slavery.”44 In this manner, Hegel 
postulates the end of history in his time. The slave overcomes the fear and terror of death 
through revolution initiated by the slave’s vanguard in the Bourgeois Intellectual:  
It is from himself, therefore, that he must free himself. And that is why the 
liberating risk of life takes the form not of risk on the field of battle, but of 
the risk created by Robespierre’s Terror. The working Bourgeois, turned 
Revolutionary, himself creates the situation that introduces into him the 
element of death. And it is only thanks to the Terror that the idea of the 
final Synthesis, which definitively “satisfies” Man, is realized.45 
 
In this manner, the slave finally overcomes his terror of both God (a sublimated master 
that is immanentized in the secular realization of the kingdom of God) and the absolute 
master death that staked the slave’s identity in the first place. In the end of history, death 
(as master) is vanquished and the slave’s identity and singularity is lost in the complete 
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gratification of desire in the universal and homogeneous state foreshadowed by 
Napoleon’s Empire: 
It is in the Terror that the State is born in which the “satisfaction” [of final 
Synthesis] is attained. This State, for the author of the Phenomenology, is 
Napoleon’s Empire. And Napoleon himself is the wholly “satisfied” Man, 
who, in and by his definitive Satisfaction, completes the course of the 
historical evolution of humanity. He is the human Individual in the proper 
and full sense of the word; because it is through him, through this 
particular man, that the “common cause,” the truly universal cause, is 
realized; and because this particular man is recognized, in his very 
particularity, by all men, universally.46 
 
By virtue of his empire, Napoleon spreads the values of the French Revolution 
abroad to the very place of Hegel’s writing of the Phenomenology in Jena. Napoleon 
lacks only one thing, “The only thing that he lacks is Self-Consciousness; he is the perfect 
Man, but he does not yet know it, and that is why Man is not fully “satisfied” in him 
alone. He cannot say of himself all that I have just said.”47  There is a long struggle in the 
master/slave dialectic where the slave ultimately overcomes death as the absolute master. 
In the consciousness of this dialectic whereby the particularity of the universal, perfect 
man Napoleon becomes manifest, Hegel secures for himself authentic self-consciousness.  
 In this manner, the tragedy of history is concluded. History is totalized as the One 
through the voiding of the tragic slave. This constitutes the voiding of the sign, but there 
is also the voiding of the significance of the slave’s self-understanding. In part because of 
the slave’s tool-like, reified consciousness, the slave’s speech aims at a kingdom of God 
in theology; yet, “theology always was an unconscious anthropology; man projected into 
the beyond, without realizing it, the idea that he had of himself, or the ideal of his own 
perfection that he pursued.”48 In the sense that the “discourse” of theology is a mere 
inarticulate pointing, it is analogous to the “speech” of ancient tragedy that gives voice to 
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the ineffable. It is by the slave’s work and struggle, that her purpose becomes clear in the 
full, explicit self-consciousness of recognition that is impossible without the overcoming 
of the master. Theology points to that which the slave qua slave, cannot understand. As 
soon as the slave “understands” that which theology implicitly signifies, the slave is no 
longer a slave, the understanding (Verstand) is no longer understanding but reason 
(Vernunft), and the significance of theological implication is no longer the discourse of 
theology but the explicit anthropological articulation of that which makes full self 
consciousness possible – the immanent kingdom of God or the end of history.  
Totality is necessary for the completeness of good infinity, and this requires that 
history have a beginning and an end. Ultimately, the phenomenology of history’s 
anthropogenesis affords the speculation into the totality of history through Hegelian 
wisdom. The driving engine of this anthropogenesis is the slave, just as the motivating 
force of tragedy is the fate of the tragic hero. Both the tragic hero and the slave are 
ultimately sacrifices in the sense that both find liberation through nihilation. Neither the 
hero nor the slave can have the self-consciousness of the audience or the Hegelian sage 
because there is nothing to be self-conscious of in the hero/slave’s nullification. 
 We have seen how Kojève grounds the meaning and standard of history upon its 
ending. This ending of history is absolute for the standards of freedom and rationality it 
establishes for all through the achievement of self-consciousness by the subject’s desire 
for recognition. Kojève takes this desire for recognition to be the essence of humanity. 
After this desire is fulfilled in the End of History, humanity will transition to post-
humanity or animality. But can this possibly be the final word on the essence of 
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humanity? If desire is the essence of humanity, is the Hegelo-Kojèvian conception of it 
accurate? 
 In the following chapter, we will see a radically different conception of desire as 
both insatiable and without lack. In a sense, Hegel’s desirous subject is tragic because of 
the finitude of his / her desire – a subject’s human essence is lost in the satiation of 
desire’s lack. For Levinas, desire may be the essence of humanity, but while desire also 
grounds one’s finitude (albeit in the desire for the infinitely perfect), such finitude is not 
tragic due to the eschatological order that preserves the finite singularity beyond any 
standard bestowed by history.
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CHAPTER III  
 
LEVINAS’S ESCHATOLOGY BEYOND HISTORY 
 
Existence is an absolute that is asserted without reference to anything else. It is 
identity. But in this reference to himself [soi-même], man perceives a type of 
duality. His identity with himself loses the character of a logical or tautological 
form; it takes on a dramatic form, as we will demonstrate. In the identity of the I 
[moi], the identity of being reveals its nature as enchainment, for it appears in the 
form of suffering and invites us to escape. Thus, escape is the need to get out of 
oneself, that is, to break that most radical and unalterably binding of chains, the 
fact that the I [moi] is oneself [soi-même]. (Levinas)1  
 
 
 
This chapter outlines Levinas’s project as an ethics as first philosophy in 
opposition to the Eleatic and henological traditions in Western philosophy. We can trace 
Levinas’s project in his reading of the cogito. Whereas the cogito leads to the separation 
of mental and physical substance for Descartes, the self-identity of the cogito 
characterizes the egoism or enjoyment of the I separated from the divine. From the 
isolation of the ego there emerges in Descartes’ Meditations a second movement which is 
a reflection on the possibility of thought that proceeds from itself by way of doubt. The 
full peculiarity of Levinas’s reading of Descartes comes into full relief by seeing desire as 
constitutive of the Cartesian subject. Whereas Hegel posits a desire in the subject beyond 
the scope of Descartes’ philosophy, Levinas reads in Descartes a de-posited desire for 
infinity in the idea of the infinite. Beyond this essential duality, my argument will help 
contextualize the conflict between the universal and particular in Levinas’s thought. This 
conflict helps to describe the perils of prophetic politics in its call for universal rights. 
On this reading of Descartes, finitude is equated with the imperfection that desires 
the infinitude of perfection through the idea of the infinite. I argue that the relationship 
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between the ego and the idea of the infinite offers a formal basis for the essential duality 
of the self, but first I will try to outline Levinas’s conception of the separable ego 
necessary for the ethical encounter with the Other.  
With reference to Descartes, Levinas argues that the perfect self-identity of the 
cogito is a result of metaphysical atheism. In positing this Cartesian disjunction, Levinas 
distinguishes himself from a long tradition: 
Levinas’s main criticism of the prevailing philosophies is that all of them 
are totalitarian and thereby miss what is most important: the Infinite. The 
framework within which they operate is the totality of beings, even when 
they make a distinction between the totality and its source; all things and 
persons are seen as parts or moments of one whole, be this Matter, Being, 
Spirit, or History. Holism is the original sin of the entire Western tradition. 
Its secret is the reduction of all differences to one overarching or 
originating reality: “the Same” (le Même), from which all things and 
relations can be unfolded by philosophy. 2  
 
If holism is the original sin of the entire Western philosophical tradition in its aim for 
totality, then its fallen nature may be characterized as henological. The henological 
tradition seeks its truth in the whole as unification where the same is resolved with the 
other in the One. To maintain the same and the other in separation, the two must be 
absolved: 
The same and the other at the same time maintain themselves in 
relationship and absolve themselves from this relation, remain absolutely 
separated. The idea of Infinity requires this separation. It was posited as 
the ultimate structure of being, as the production of its very infinitude. 
Society accomplishes it concretely. But is not to broach being on the level 
of separation to broach it in its fallenness? The positions we have outlined 
oppose the ancient privilege of unity which is affirmed from Parmenides 
to Spinoza and Hegel.3  
 
The absolving relation between the same and the other can be read in the religious sense 
of how one can absolve oneself from the yoke of religious or ethical obligation. This 
dissolution of one’s yoke with the divine constitutes a metaphysical atheism or egoism: 
             29
One can call atheism this separation so complete that the separated being 
maintains itself in existence all by itself, without participating in the Being 
from which it is separated – eventually capable of adhering to it by belief. 
The break with participation is implied in this capability. One lives outside 
of God, at home with oneself; one is an I, an egoism. The soul, the 
dimension of the psychic, being an accomplishment of separation, is 
naturally atheist. By atheism we thus understand a position prior to both 
the negation and the affirmation of the divine, the breaking with 
participation by which the I posits itself as the same as I.4  
 
This separated being is analogous to the pure thought that proceeds from itself: a cogito  
 
unconditioned by infinity and unaware of its finitude. The I posits its isolated ego, which 
is at one and the same time, perfectly identical with the I and conditions the I in its 
separation and egoism. In the self-positing of the I, we may broach the egology of the 
Cartesian Meditations in their relevance to Levinas’s project. 
The positing of the cogito’s self-identity requires a particular time and place. For 
Levinas, this time and place is the self present here of the first person:  
Thought, which idealism has accustomed us to locate outside of space, is – 
essentially, and not as the result of a fall or a degradation – here. The body 
excluded by the Cartesian doubt is the body object. The cogito does not 
lead to the impersonal position: “there is thought,” but to the first person 
in the present: “I am something that thinks.” The word thing is here 
admirably exact. For the most profound teaching of the Cartesian cogito 
consists in discovering thought as a substance, that is, as something that is 
posited. Thought has a point of departure. There is not only a 
consciousness of localization, but a localization of consciousness, which is 
not in turn reabsorbed into consciousness, into knowing. There is here 
something that stands out against knowing, that is a condition for 
knowing.5 
 
The self-identity of the cogitator follows from the immediacy of the cogito’s self-
presence. Of course, "here" cannot be taken in any spatial or extensional sense in 
maintaining the Cartesian presupposition of thinking and extended beings as distinct 
substances. The substance that exists "there" from sensuous intuition is distinct from the 
substance that exists here out of its self-presence from rational intuition. As such, the ego 
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of the Cartesian cogito is perfectly self-identical in the psychic interiority of the cogito. 
The conclusively existent, cogitator that proceeds from its thought posits its self identity 
in the distinct, originary thought of the cogito. Given the posited distinctness of its 
substance, thinking being cannot be identical to extended substance; therefore, thinking 
being is nothing other than thinking being.  
For Descartes, humans are essentially thinking beings, and this self identity 
entails the absolute separation between thinking and extended being, and yet we cannot 
think of the I riveted to itself as though the mind were riveted to the body through the 
pineal gland. Rather, the I is substantiated insofar as it posits thought. For Levinas the 
self identity of the cogito is the metaphysical atheism of egoism absolved from the 
divine. Whereas the cogito is the formalized notion of separation:  
Enjoyment accomplishes the atheist separation; it deformalizes the notion 
of separation, which is not a cleavage made in the abstract, but the 
existence at home with itself of an autochthonous I. The soul is not, as in 
Plato, what “has the care of inanimate being everywhere”; it to be sure 
dwells in what is not itself, but it acquires its own identity by this dwelling 
in the “other” (and not logically, by opposition to the other).6  
 
Without any second moments, the I posits the ego through the self-presence of the cogito 
while the ego then conditions the I in a material closure that Levinas refers to as atheist 
separation. The perfect self-identity of the I constitutes its singularity, “The unicity of the 
I conveys separation. Separation in the strictest sense is solitude, and enjoyment – 
happiness or happiness – is isolation itself . . . This logically absurd structure of unicity, 
this non-participation in genus, is the very egoism of happiness”7  
Levinas’s interpretation of Descartes is distinct in that it distinguishes him from 
the tradition of henological metaphysics that culminates in Hegel; however, contrary to 
Hegel’s understanding of Descartes for the significance of his own project, it is 
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incumbent upon Levinas’s project to distinguish his interpretation of Descartes from that 
of the henological tradition. Nonetheless, one premise that Hegel and Levinas’s 
interpretations of Descartes share up to a point is the necessity of a signification for the 
conclusive indication of the cogitator’s being. It is conceivable that one can have 
thoughts without speech where the extra-linguistic thought could be formulated into the 
recognition of one’s cognizing, and this recognition could then be the basis for a rational, 
yet ineffable judgment of the cogitator’s conclusive existence.  
If, contra Descartes, ethics is first philosophy rather than epistemology, then 
Levinas cannot presuppose the ineffability of the cogito. In Perpich's The Ethics of 
Emmanuel Levinas, the question of the moral skepticism is addressed through the 
phenomenological performative contradiction8 where the very addressing of the question 
presupposes the face of the Other as addressee. How does this pertain to Descartes' 
method of universal doubt? Descartes is not merely a moral skeptic, but initially he is 
even a skeptic about his own existence; however, a non-expressive subjectivity is a 
contradictio in adjecto, because subjectivity requires a face and the face is always already 
in expression. This is not to say that a mirror is sufficient for philosophically determining 
one’s existence by viewing one’s expression (as animals could do, I suppose). This does 
say that the cogito is inherently reflective such as the perfect self-identity of I = I in the 
posited ego. One cannot reflect without one’s self-expression. Since self-reflection is 
necessary for the cogito, only expressive beings can perform the cogito. Automatons 
(such as animals, for Descartes) are expressionless, and therefore do not admit of the 
reflective activity necessary for res cogitans.  
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Can we say that a performative contradiction itself is tantamount to the certain 
deduction of the cogitator’s existence just as any diction is sufficient as a cogitation of 
the cogito? It would be, except that the subjectivity of the cogito (that is, thinking 
substance) is itself the positing of expression. If the I expresses itself in the cogito, such 
an expression is a positing that substantiates the Ego through signification, but something 
beyond the Ego is also indicated. As stated in Totality and Infinity, ex-pression concretely 
presses thinking substance out of itself for the Other, and so it is a revelation of the Other:  
[I]n its expressive function language precisely maintains the other – to 
whom it is addressed, whom it calls upon or invokes. To be sure, language 
does not consist in invoking him as a being represented and thought. But 
this is why language institutes a relation irreducible to the subject-object 
relation: the revelation of the other.9 
 
 Without the revelation of expression, there is no means of signification by which 
the Ego could be posited in the Cartesian utterance "I think." If the order of language is 
not posited by the thinking being’s expression, then the cogito retains only the silent, 
formal self-maintenance of egoism. If signification (qua expression) holds in the cogito, 
then the separable isolating ego has admitted of the revelation of the Other beyond the 
perfect self identity of the subject’s egoism. On this order of revelation, the ego is 
conditioned by its relation to an Other beyond the ego’s self-containment. Speech and 
ethics are projected together in ethics as first philosophy; therefore, any epistemological 
or ontological claim on the identity of the self with the same is contingent upon the self-
difference motivated by the ethical claim of the Other. Revelation is a relation and my 
expression reveals the Other in the sense that all expression is an expression of desire for 
that which is ultimately beyond possession, so in one’s expression, the Other is revealed 
rather than posited, but who is this Other in relation to the ego? If expression is a 
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reflection of the I, who is this Other that makes the reflection possible? In short, it is the 
other of finitude.  
We have already seen how the ego loses its isolating powers in the cogito’s 
expression towards the Other, but there is a “second movement” to Descartes’ meditation 
which equates doubt and suspicion with finitude and then infers how this finitude (and 
hence universal doubt) is possible: 
This finitude could not be determined without recourse to the infinite . . . 
The Cartesian subject is given a point of view exterior to itself from which 
it can apprehend itself. If, in a first movement, Descartes takes a 
consciousness to be indubitable of itself by itself, in a second movement – 
the reflection on reflection – he recognizes conditions for this certitude. 
This certitude is due to the clarity and distinctness of the cogito, but 
certitude itself is sought because of the presence of infinity in this finite 
thought, which without this presence would be ignorant of its own 
finitude: . . .10 
 
The Cartesian method of universal doubt is only possible through the consciousness of 
the ego’s imperfection. In the ego’s burdened identity with the I, the I nonetheless finds 
itself conditioned in its finitude by the posited Ego. Through the imperfection of finitude: 
the I is already riveted to itself, its freedom is not as light as grace but 
already a heaviness, the ego is irremissibly itself. I am not dramatizing a 
tautology. The turning of the ego back upon itself is precisely neither a 
serene reflection nor the result of a purely philosophical reflection. The 
relationship with itself is . . . the relationship with a double chained to the 
ego, a viscous, heavy, stupid double, but one the ego [le moi] is with 
precisely because it is me [moi]. . . . My being doubles with a having; I am 
encumbered by myself.11  
 
On this interpretation, Descartes argues that a genuine understanding of one’s finitude 
(and hence, doubt) is only possible through an idea of perfection and infinity. We could 
say that the idea of the infinite is implicit in all expression. In the expression of the face, 
one reveals the Other that cannot be imagined of one’s own powers.  
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In this idea of infinity, one gains both a sense of self-distance as well as a 
“metaphysical desire”12 for the absolute otherness of the Desired, which is beyond 
visibility. The perfect identity of the I and the ego is predicated upon the Cartesian 
method of doubt, yet the cogitator’s “doubt makes it seek certainty. But this suspicion, 
this consciousness of doubt, implies the idea of the Perfect.”13 In the finitude of reason, 
we find the cogito's perfect self identity is not yet a completing (perfectiō) in its 
asymmetrical relation to and metaphysical desire for the infinitely perfect. For Levinas, 
“Precisely perfection exceeds conception, overflows the concept; it designates distance: 
the idealization that makes it possible is a passage to the other absolutely other. The idea 
of the perfect is an idea of infinity.”14    
Because Levinas “sees being informed by a principle of identity and sameness, as 
hegemonic and henological and therefore irremediably atheistic and “anethical,” Levinas 
posits the need to pass beyond being – beyond ontology – in order to make ethics 
possible.”15 In this context, “henology” concerns the unity of being, and insofar as the 
principle of identity reduces the other to unity of the same, henology seems to exclude the 
possibility of ethics. On the other hand, although metaphysical desire is not a desire for 
unity, it is nonetheless a desire for a completing (perfectiō) that can only be found in the 
singularity of the (one and only) God through the face of the Other. One should note a 
certain irony in Levinas’s reading of Descartes’ ontological proof for God. Instead of 
ontologizing God through the idea of the Infinite, Levinas seems to use a henological 
argument for God’s existence, which infers that a universal whole (in God’s perfection) is 
logically necessary for the completion of its particular part (in finite reasoning). If such a 
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reading of Descartes’ proof for God’s existence is indeed henological, Levinas employs 
henological reasoning as the crucial lever for his anti-henological project. 
Nonetheless, on this understanding of perfection, perfect self identity is a 
contradiction of terms insofar as self identity is a concept derived from the total de-
distancing of the cogito’s conception. In my expression, the Other is revealed in the idea 
of infinity, which dis-closes my egoism or metaphysical atheism (a paradoxical phrase 
for Levinas) in its separation from the wholly Other or God. In the idea of the infinite, the 
ego’s totality is breached. We can maintain the singularity of the I, but it can no longer be 
at home with itself as it reflects on the conditions the cogito’s reasoning, “When the I is 
identified with reason, taken as the power of thematization and objectification, it loses its 
very ipseity. To represent to oneself is to empty oneself of one’s subjective substance and 
to insensibilize enjoyment.”16 On my reading, the I identified with reason is the ego, yet 
the I regains its ipseity through the material conditioning of the ego (egoism). As a 
product of the cogito, the posited and substantial ego is exposed in its finite reasoning 
when confronted with the de-posited idea of the Infinite. Whereas the I posits the ego 
from the need for self-possession, the ego discovers upon reflection the desire for infinity 
in the deposited idea of the infinite, “The idea of infinity is the mode of being, the 
infinition, of infinity. Infinity does not first exist, and then reveal itself. Its infinition is 
produced as revelation, as a positing of its idea in me.”17 Here, we can see the relation 
between metaphysical desire and metaphysical atheism:  
Needs constitute the dynamism through which I attack, appropriate, and 
swallow the elements and all things that are enjoyable, but desire drives 
me out of myself toward that which cannot become part of me or my 
property: something that is ab-solute, freed or “absolved” from the 
possibility of being a moment of “the same.” Levinas calls this absolute 
other “invisible” because, even in the form of another person, there is 
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something in it - precisely that which is desired - that cannot be 
appropriated, interiorized, and integrated by seeing, perception, 
observation, or contemplation.18  
 
In the empty anonymity of one’s particular ego posited by need, the asymmetrical, 
ethical relation with the Other begins with desire. Such desire “is like goodness – the 
Desired does not fulfill it, but deepens it.”19 This deepening occurs through a 
dispossessing of one’s self at the command of the other: 
In designating what it possesses to the other, in speaking, the subject 
hovers over its own existence. But it is from the welcoming of the infinity 
of the other that it receives the freedom with regard to itself that this 
dispossession requires. It detains it finally from the Desire which does not 
arise from a lack or a limitation but from a surplus, from the idea of 
Infinity.20 
 
Levinas’s conception of desire is remarkable when distinguished from desire as found in 
Hegel as desire for pure prestige, which proves to ultimately be a desire for the totality of 
history through the cunning negativity of reason.  
We must now indicate the terms which will state the deformalization or 
the concretization of the idea of infinity, this apparently wholly empty 
notion. The infinite in the finite, the more in the less, which is 
accomplished by the idea of Infinity, is produced as Desire . . .  Desire and 
goodness concretely presuppose a relationship in which the Desirable 
arrests the “negativity” of the I that holds sway in the Same – puts an end 
to power and emprise.21 
 
Desire for perfection is discernable in the I’s perfect self-identity with the Ego. Through 
the idea of the infinite, one discovers the unconditionally desirable. True to its positive 
nature, the idea of the infinite is self-deforming. In the overflowing of its own idea, the 
positivity of the unconditionally Desirable becomes manifest to the finite reasoning of the 
ego. This formal structure of the I, the ego, the idea of the infinite and infinity can be 
represented as such: 
(-> = positing) I <-> Ego <- Idea of the Infinite <- the Infinite (<- = conditioning) 
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The structure of this schematic is reminiscent of the four segments of Plato’s divided line 
as found in the Republic (VI, 509d-511e). To take the I and the Ego as perfectly self-
identical is to consider oneself in totality as a singularity.  This perfect self identity of the 
I conditioned by the Ego and the Ego posited by the I is a cyclical process of unification 
whereby one becomes a unicity. Nonetheless, this totalized self identity is shaken when 
the ego recognizes the finite, particularity of its anonymous reasoning. Since it is 
precisely the idea of the infinite that always overflows itself, such an idea is impossible to 
totalize; therefore, anyone with an idea of Infinity cannot retain the totality necessary for 
perfect self-identity. Such a totality is breached and overflowed with the idea of the 
infinite, which seals the disjunction between the singularity of the I and the particularity 
of the Ego.  
It is worth emphasizing that Levinas does not posit the I and the Ego as 
topographical psychoanalytical terms, a la Freud. In describing Levinas’s notions of 
metaphysical atheism and metaphysical desire, however, it is useful to distinguish 
between the I and the Ego for describing the movement from ontological self-sameness 
towards the expression of transcendence in escape and desire. As metaphysical terms, 
how does Levinas concretize the analysis of escape and desire, beyond questions of 
identity, into something that resembles ethical practice? I will argue that Levinas’s 
interpretation of the formal structure of the cogito underlies the concrete sociopolitical 
relations of the Self in relation to the Other and the Third Party. 
In the revelation of the cogito, we see that the perfect self identity of the ego is put 
into question. I wish to articulate the sense of Levinas’s sociopolitical ambivalence of 
identity that follows from his conception of the bivalent self; but before addressing these 
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issues in Levinas’s thought, attention should be given to the concrete structures of 
interpersonal life as found in the encounter between Self and Other. 
Contrary to Hegel’s understanding of anthropological transformation through the 
dialectic between master and slave, transformation does not come from the slave’s labor 
of fear and struggle. Rather, for Levinas, transformation originates through the Other as 
master/teacher. Levinas explicitly states that an objective of TI is to establish “this 
primacy of the ethical, that is, of the relationship of man to man – signification, teaching, 
and justice – a primacy of an irreducible structure upon which all the other structures rest 
(and in particular all those which seem to put us primordially in contact with an 
impersonal sublimity, aesthetic or ontological) . . .”22 As reviewed above in Levinas’s 
reading of the cogito, Descartes’ epistemology as first philosophy was replaced with 
ethics as first philosophy, but how is it that ethical transformation must precede the 
sociopolitical transformations required by justice? An examination of the relation 
between ethics and ontology will help clarify this question. 
 Ethics that proceeds from the impersonal order of the ontological (deontology) is 
better described as politics in its concern for the hypothetical face of the third party:  
Discourse conditions thought, for the first intelligible is not a concept, but 
an intelligence whose inviolable exteriority the face states in uttering the 
“you shall not commit murder.” The essence of discourse is ethical. In 
stating this thesis, idealism is refused. . . . Idealism completely carried out 
reduces all ethics to politics.”23 
 
If discourse conditions thought and the essence of discourse is ethical, then thought itself 
is essentially conditioned by the ethical. This is formally demonstrated in the finite 
thought of the cogito conditioned by the perfection of the Infinite and expressed with 
desire for the Other in the idea of infinity. The injunction to not murder, as expressed in 
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the face of the Other, is lost in a universal political discourse where everyone is 
subsumed as a faceless particular subject to the to the impersonal mediation of an all-
powerful third party, such as the sovereign of the state. The mediating third party could 
simply be the hypothetical third found in the categorical imperatives of the moral law (for 
example, the self-defeating test: what if every third party, in the absence of myself and 
the Other, stole on the basis of my legislating theft as a universally acceptable behavior?) 
While ethics precedes the order of the political, the structures of ethics, justice and the 
master/teacher all direct attentive concern towards a non-mediating third party that serves 
as a condition for the Other’s mastery: 
The poor one, the stranger, presents himself as an equal. His equality 
within this essential poverty consists in referring to the third party, thus 
present at the encounter, whom in the midst of his destitution the Other 
already serves. He comes to join me. But he joins me to himself for 
service; he commands me as a Master. This command can concern me 
only inasmuch as I am master myself; consequently this command 
commands me to command. The thou is posited in front of a we. To be we 
is not to “jostle” one another or get together around a common task. The 
presence of the face, the infinity of the other, is a destituteness, a presence 
of the third party (that is, of the whole of humanity which looks at us), and 
a command that commands commanding.24 
 
In the above passage, we can discern the following terms: Self (the I of Myself), Myself 
(commanded by the Self), the Other, and the Other’s others. In these four categories, we 
have a structural hierarchy of ethical obligation. This is represented as follows: 
 
(Enjoys)  Myself <-> Self  <- Other <- Others   (Commands)  
 
 
Through discourse, we discover the concrete, deformalized societal structure that is  
 
isomorphic25 with the structure of the cogito. The Other commands me to command 
myself for the sake of the Other’s Others, and the Myself necessarily enjoys its Self in the 
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metaphysical atheism born of the separation between the Self and Other. The primary 
motivation for this metaphysical atheism is the physical need for wholeness, comfort and 
security. John Llewelyn expresses this materialist aspect of Levinas’s thought succinctly, 
“Levinas approves Marx for saying . . . ethics has a base in economics. But Levinas’s 
endorsement of this aspect of Marx’s materialism goes along with a more complex 
conception of materialism and of what constitutes a base.” (65, The Genealogy of Ethics) 
Of course, ethics as first philosophy is at great variance with Marxist economism. For 
Levinas, the “base” of ethics is the presupposition of metaphysical atheism and 
materialistic egoism for the concrete, evental welcoming of the Other.   
The relationship between the Self and Other should not be read as the dialectical 
materialism of the Master and Slave where the Self is exploited by the Other’s commands 
until the Self has nothing left to lose; however, there is a passivity on the part of the Self 
that marks a fundamental asymmetry between the Self and Other. In the experience of 
suffering (and in the absence of self-possessing enjoyment), the Self is distanced from 
itself, “But in this extreme consciousness, where the will reaches mastery in a new sense, 
where death no longer touches it, extreme passivity becomes extreme mastery. The 
egoism of the will stands on the verge of an existence that no longer accents itself.”26 
 Related to this question of passivity, Derrida notes:  
Levinas would probably not say it in this way, but could it not be argued 
that, without exonerating myself in the least, decision and responsibility 
are always of the other? They always come back or come down to the 
other, from the other, even if it is the other in me? For, in the end, would 
an initiative that remained purely and simply “mine” still be a decision, in 
accordance with the most powerful tradition of ethics and philosophy, 
which requires that the decision always be “my” decision, the decision of 
one who can freely say “as for myself, I,” ipse, egomet ipse? Would what 
comes down to me in this way still be a decision? Do we have the right to 
give the name “decision” to a purely autonomous movement, even if it is 
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one of welcoming or hospitality, that would proceed only from me, by me, 
and would simply deploy the possibilities of a subjectivity that is mine?27 
 
To extend this logic even further, it is not the singularity of the I that meets the 
singularity of the infinite through the mediating force of the idea of the infinite. Rather, it 
is the non-singularity of the ego that provides a home of signification in the welcoming 
encounter with the idea of the singularly infinite.  
In Derrida’s reflection on the Self’s lack of autonomy in receiving the Other, there 
does seem to be a double decision where the Other first decides in the radically passive 
Self, and the Self in turn decides in itself how to carry out the Other’s decision in the 
Myself of the Self.28 While Derrida’s remarks are not properly exegetical, they do 
emphasize the irreversibility and asymmetry that obtains for Levinas between the Self 
and Other. To remain faithful to Levinas’s intention, the encounter between the Self and 
Other is most likely between a singular Self and a singular Other.29 We can say that 
insofar as Myself is at home with its Self in enjoyment, its singularity seems obscured; 
yet, the distinctness of its singularity is enhanced when the distance between the Self and 
Myself is opened upon suffering the Other.  
The Myself, as opposed to the Self, is in a position of autonomy as it enjoys the 
Self in its separation from the Other. In the above schematic, no one of the four terms is 
central. Rather, it is the event of the asymmetrical, ethical encounter between the Self and 
the Other that is crucial. Perhaps this unnameable event is tantamount to “the god so 
close that we can no longer see him. Not because he has disappeared inside us, but, on the 
contrary, because in coming closer, and disappearing the closer he comes, he has made 
all our inside, all subjectivity, disappear with him.”30 The Other as master teaches and 
commands self-commandment, and the only ethical response the Self can offer is through 
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finding the Myself no longer lost in its Self (to be at home with one’s Self is to be 
fundamentally lost in one’s Self); however, there is a debilitating loss of meaning without 
the Other’s others. Without this category, the category of the Self (rather than the evental 
encounter between Self and Other) becomes the central term between the Other and the 
Myself in the isolation of idolatrous glossolalia:  
Language as the presence of the face does not invite complicity with the 
preferred being, the self-sufficient “I-Thou” forgetful of the universe; in 
its frankness it refuses the clandestinity of love, where it loses its 
frankness and meaning and turns into laughter or cooing. The third party 
looks at me in the eyes of the Other – language is justice.31 
 
Without the third party, the encounter with the other is like the idea of the infinite, 
negatively understood. The Other (or the idea of the infinite, analogously) becomes 
imagined and posited rather than deposited in my life, and this sense of infinity is self-
generated. In this manner, ethics would not be possible without politics to the extent that 
the third party serves “as shorthand for the impersonal institutions of legal and political 
judgment,”32 where language can concretely situate itself as justice; and yet genuine 
speech also speaks to the preservation of the personal singularity in the Other and through 
the Other.  
There is yet another, darker conceptualization that Levinas offers on the meaning 
of the political as that which is in contradistinction to the eschatological. This distinction 
will help prepare my argument that the sociopolitical conflict between the universalism of 
French cosmopolitanism and the particularity Jewish ethnicity (as in Levinas’s life) is in 
some way grounded upon the manifest asymmetry between the Self and Other, which is, 
in turn, reflective of the formal imperfection of the cogito’s self-identity conditioned by 
the infinitely perfect. I realize the delicacy of this subject and the possibility of 
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insensitivity on my part, yet I will strive to adequately represent this genuine conflict in 
Levinas’s own thought born of his French and Jewish identities. In addressing this 
subject, my thesis concerning the universal and homogeneous state will be well served by 
confronting the question of whether Jewish universalism is paradoxical.  
Before addressing the meaning and politics of Jewish universalism, it is necessary 
to give some sense to what Levinas understood as the realm of the political beyond the 
impersonal organization of the third party. In short, the political pertains to war and 
peace:   
The moral consciousness can sustain the mocking gaze of the political 
man only if the certitude of peace dominates the evidence of war. Such a 
certitude is not obtained by a simple play of antitheses. The peace of 
empires issued from war rests on war. It does not restore the alienated 
beings their lost identity. For that a primordial and original relation with 
being is needed.33 
 
As I understand the passage, Levinas’s reference to being allies politics with ontology. 
This alliance is consistent with Kojève’s conception of self-directed becoming vis-à-vis 
the negation of being,34 which ultimately results in the end of history and the termination 
of the master/slave dialectic. The ethical, on the other hand, precedes ontology and so it is 
allied with what Levinas calls eschatology, which “institutes a relation with being beyond 
the totality or beyond history, and not with being beyond the past and the present.”35 By 
way of contrast, Hegel’s End of History is an immanent, ontological event, and the 
universal and homogeneous state that rationally derives from the End of History (in the 
later Kojève’s view with certain provisos) is an imminent, political event predicated upon 
the totality of history. As with the singularity of the idea of the infinite,36 the order of the 
eschatological also speaks to an evasion from history’s particularization of eternity: 
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The eschatological, as the “beyond” of history, draws beings out of the 
jurisdiction of history and the future; it arouses them in and calls them 
forth to their full responsibility. Submitting history as a whole to 
judgment, exterior to the very wars that mark its end, it restores to each 
instant its full signification in that very instant: all the causes are ready to 
be heard. It is not the last judgment that is decisive, but the judgment of all 
the instants in time, when the living are judged. The eschatological notion 
of judgment (contrary to the judgment of history in which Hegel wrongly 
saw its rationalization) implies that beings have an identity “before” 
eternity, before the accomplishment of history, before the fullness of time, 
while there is still time; implies that beings exist in relationship, to be 
sure, but on the basis of themselves and not on the basis of the totality.37 
 
The order of the eschatological ensures the preservation of the singularity within history. 
The order of the political submits the singularity as a sacrifice to the judgment of history. 
As discussed in Chapter II, the singular slave, for example, is equivalent to a tragic cipher 
at the end of history when all labor (exploitation) and struggle (war) culminates in writing 
history as a tragedy. Key to understanding the eschatological order is separation – by 
virtue of eschatology, one is afforded a separation from the totality of history and 
preserved in her singularity from tragic annihilation. Regardless of what one thinks of the 
future, eschatological thought rejects any justification for past exploitations and wars that 
inevitably displace any historical individual’s singular voice with a universal narrative:  
The idea of being overflowing history makes possible existents [étants] 
both involved in being and personal, called upon to answer at their trial 
and consequently already adult – but, for that very reason, existents that 
can speak rather than lending their lips to an anonymous utterance of 
history. Peace is produced as this aptitude for speech. The eschatological 
vision breaks with the totality of wars and empires in which one does not 
speak. It does not envisage the end of history within being understood as a 
totality, but institutes a relation with the infinity of being which exceeds 
the totality.38 
 
Prophets exemplify this aptitude for speech in the production of peace. Universal human 
rights have “prophetic roots,”39 and the prophet’s concern is properly eschatological 
rather than futural in her call for responsibility before an infinite God. It is within this 
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context of the eschatological that we can begin to understand Jewish universalism. With 
reference to the Jews, Levinas notes that “the truth – the knowledge of God – is not a 
question of dogma for them, but one of action, as in Jeremiah 22, and that a Jew can 
communicate just as intimately with a non-Jew who portrays morality – in other words, 
with the Noachide – as with another Jew.”40 By basing truth in action rather than belief, 
the conditions for a Jewish universalism are established.   
A chosen people is chosen by virtue of the active response to the prophetic call to 
learn from the prophets as masters. What the prophets teach is a universalism. With 
reference to the Jewish people, Levinas notes: 
We have the reputation of considering ourselves to be a chosen people, 
and this reputation greatly wrongs this universalism. The idea of a chosen 
people must not be taken as a sign of pride. It does not involve being 
aware of exceptional rights, but of exceptional duties. It is the prerogative 
of a moral consciousness itself. It knows itself at the centre of the world 
and for it the world is not homogeneous: for I am always alone in being 
able to answer the call, I am irreplaceable in my assumption of 
responsibility. Being chosen involves a surplus of obligations for which 
the ‘I’ of moral consciousness utters. “This is what is represented by the 
Jewish concept of Israel and the sense that it is a chosen people. It is not 
‘still anterior’ to the universalism of a homogeneous society in which the 
differences between Jew, Greek and barbarian are abolished. It already 
includes this abolition but remains, for a Jew, a condition that is at any 
moment still indispensable to such an abolition, which in turn at any 
moment is still about to commence. 41 
 
The Jewish concept of Israel is a force for homogenization to the extent that this concept 
is based on moral action rather than belief, yet how is this consistent with the order of the 
eschatological? The eschatological preserves a sense of singularity beyond history, and in 
hearing the call of the prophet, “I am always alone in being able to answer the call,”42 and 
so one is taught universalism in one’s unicity. One is called to separation at the center of 
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the heterogeneous world to create the conditions for universal fraternity and its resulting 
homogenization.   
 To the extent that France represents the ideal of universality, we can see why 
Levinas embraced France, “Adherence to France is a metaphysical act, of course, it had 
to be France, a country that expresses its political expresses its political existence with a 
trinitarian emblem which is moral and philosophical, and is inscribed on the front of its 
public buildings.”43 Caygill comments that the reference to the “trinitarian emblem” 
refers to the ideals of the 1789 Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man: 
liberty, equality and fraternity.44 
In the schematic below, we can interpret the development from unicity towards 
ethnicity as the formation of community. We can also interpret one's nationality as the 
idea of universality or the promise of internationality that is ultimately grounded in the 
eschatological vocation of Israel. If so, we have the following schematic structurally 
consistent with the divided line employed thus far: 
Individual <-> Jewish Ethnicity <- French cosmopolitanism <- Jewish 
universalism 
 
And alternatively we have: 
 
Singularity <-> particularity <- idea of universalism <- eschatology 
 
 Where “->”  = formation of communal identity  
and “<-” = formation of universal fraternity 
 
In the above schematic, we can see how concerns regarding ethnic assimilation become 
evident if one’s ethnicity is both pressured in the formation of a concrete, ethnic 
community while also being chosen for the infinite responsibility of extending and 
deepening fraternity universally.  As Caygill notes regarding universal rights, “The view 
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that such rights mark a realization of prophetic politics runs the risk of assimilation, 
namely the dissolution of a particular Jewish identity in the realization of universal 
human fraternity through the declaration of universal human rights.”45 For any person 
concerned with universal rights, there is a desire to assimilate with the French identity of 
cosmopolitanism insofar as this identity is grounded upon the universal vocation of 
Israel, but such a desire risks the loss of one’s particular ethnic identity. 
We can say that it is not the community that is chosen by the eschatological call 
so much as the individual who, in her absolute separation, is “always alone in being able 
to answer the call,” but nonetheless receives this call through the tradition of her faith 
community. The question of assimilation remains: if universal fraternity is realized, and 
the world is made “Jewish” in the sense of moral action rather than belief, what then 
happens to the Jewish faith community? Is it simply lost in the totality of universal 
homogenization? I will address these concerns regarding assimilation in Chapter IV, but 
for now we may view Levinas's conflicting Jewish and French identities as, in some way, 
a conflict between universalizing Judaism (through universal fraternity – if everyone is 
Jewish, then no one is Jewish) and particularizing Judaism (preserving the concrete 
practice of Judaism from disappearing into a secular pluralism). I do not mean to critique, 
justify or resolve the ambivalence Levinas had between his French and Jewish identities. 
I merely want to provide an adequate description of that conflict in terms of the universal 
structures of interpersonal ethical relations that challenge one’s identity on Levinas’s 
understanding.  
  Levinas’s thought is nonetheless unequivocally opposed to Kojève’s End of 
History thesis understood as history’s self-generated tragic structure from which all final 
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judgments are decreed without consideration for the singularity of any particular within 
history; however, is the order of the eschatological necessarily opposed to the project of 
realizing the universal and homogeneous state, if Kojève took such a sate of affairs to be 
the Left Hegelian interpretation of the End of History’s rational outcome? Might it be a 
genuinely ethical project to strive for a universal and homogeneous state given the 
concerns and issues raised thus far? Given this chapter’s exegesis of both the theoretical 
and concrete aspects of Levinas’s philosophical project, I will endeavor to address these 
questions in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV  
 
UNIVERSALITY WITHOUT TOTALITY 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I address the question of whether the project of a universal and 
homogeneous state is consistent with Levinasian ethics, and if it is in fact an ethical 
demand. I will not try to address how the realization of the universal and homogeneous 
sate is possible or whether ethics is pertinent to its realization from the perspective of 
Marxist orthodoxy. I only want to argue that while its realization is clearly the rational 
project for post-historical humanity on Kojève’s reading such a realization is also an 
ethical project from a Levinasian perspective. In this chapter, I discuss the thought of 
Kojève, Derrida, Horkheimer, Adorno and Žižek – all thinkers of the left. In my 
argument that a Levinasian can view the universal and homogeneous state as a worthy 
ethical project, I will try to position Levinas’s thought within the context of universal 
emancipation as thought by the above thinkers.  
 This chapter has three parts. In the first part, I will address how Levinas’s 
conception of mastery (contrary to Hegel’s conception of mastery) is relevant to post-
historical society as Kojève envisions it. Derrida outlined a reading of Kojève’s End of 
History as the time of “the pure humanity of man, of the other man and of man as 
other,”1 when post-historical humanity is obligated to reinvent its humanity through 
custom and culture. This Levinasian formulation of the end of history understands 
Kojève as placing a moral imperative on the post-historical projects of humanity, which 
would include the universal and homogeneous state. Whereas the master in the Hegelian 
dialectic is superseded in the end of history, the master/student relationship helps serve 
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the post-historical duty to reinvent humanity in the master’s cultivation of desire in the 
tutor. 
 In the second part, I explore Hegel and Levinas’s differing conceptions of desire. 
I argue that the insatiability characteristic of desire in Levinas’s understanding is often 
conflated with satiable need. In Horkheimer and Adorno depiction of Odysseus’ 
encounter with the Sirens in the Odyssey, we have a metaphor that sharply distinguishes 
between need and desire. This distinction is critical for characterizing the universal and 
homogeneous state where all need is met and desire is cultivated. For Horkheimer and 
Adorno, this image is relevant for conceptualizing the domineering nature of instrumental 
reason as shaped by the desire for pure prestige. To subject instrumental reason to 
practical reason requires the clarification between desire and need, and the Sirens may 
serve to illustrate emancipation as the desire for the sojourn rather than the return home.   
 In the third part, I address Žižek’s criticism of Levinas’s system of ethics. Žižek 
essentially argues that the Levinasian ethics of love is a hindrance to the work of justice. 
If Žižek is correct, Levinas’s thought would be generally inconsistent with the work of 
realizing the universal and homogeneous state. Žižek privileges the Third Party above the 
Other as the true expression of justice; yet, I argue that he misunderstands the 
relationship between the Other and the Third Party since the Other is commanded by the 
Third Party, and the Self is obligated to work with the Other for the elimination of the 
need and dispossession of those that stand behind and command the Other. From the 
standpoint of Levinasian ethics, we can interpret the universal and homogeneous state as 
the universal, legal codification of deontological practical philosophy (interminable 
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politicization, as Derrida would put it), all of which Levinas considers to be within the 
political domain rather than the ethical domain.  
As detailed in Chapter II, the anthropogenesis of self consciousness was traced in 
the master slave dialectic as a tragic totality, but what takes place after the tragedy of 
human history? For Kojève, post-historical humanity marks the beginning of a farce or 
comedy replete with talking animals. Despite the postmodern irony that characterizes 
Kojève’s geopolitical analysis, one must admire the bravo with which he asserted the 
counterintuitive implications of his Hegelian philosophy. Nevertheless, as we shall see, 
Kojève’s ironic geopolitical analysis does serve a purpose for what he takes to be the 
outlines of a general form of life characteristic of the universal and homogeneous state. 
What follows is the infamous footnote that Kojève added to the 2nd edition of the 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: 
If Man becomes an animal again, his arts, his loves, and his play must also 
become purely “natural” again. Hence it would have to be admitted that 
after the end of History, men would construct their edifices and works of 
art as birds build their nests and spiders spin their webs . . . But one cannot 
then say that all this “makes Man happy.” One would have to say that 
post-historical animals of the species Homo sapiens (which will live 
amidst abundance and complete security) will be content as a result of 
their artistic, erotic and playful behavior, inasmuch as, by definition, they 
will be contented with it. But there is more. “The definitive annihilation of 
Man properly so-called” also means the definitive disappearance of 
human Discourse (Logos) in the strict sense. Animals of the species Homo 
Sapiens would react by conditioned reflexes to vocal signals or sign 
“language,” and thus their so-called “discourses” would be like what is 
supposes to be the “language” of bees. What would disappear then is not 
only Philosophy or the search for discursive Wisdom, but also that 
Wisdom itself. For in these post-historical animals, there would no longer 
be any “[discursive] understanding of the World and of self.2 
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In this footnote, Kojève describes how his opinion on the timing of humanity’s return to 
animality had changed from 1946 to 1948. Rather than anticipating this return to 
animality sometime in the future, Kojève came to the understanding: 
that the Hegelian-Marxist end of History was not yet to come, but was 
already a present, here and now. Observing what was taking place around 
me and reflecting on what had taken place in the world since the Battle of 
Jena, I understood that Hegel was right to see in this battle the end of 
History properly so-called. In and by this battle the vanguard of humanity 
virtually attained the limit and the aim, that is, the end, of Man’s historical 
evolution. What has happened since then was but an extension in space of 
the universal revolutionary force actualized in France by Robespierre-
Napoleon.3 
 
In this passage, there are number of ideas worth clarifying. Here, Kojève clearly 
distinguishes between the end of history and the universal homogeneous state. While it is 
certain that Kojève did not live in a universal and homogeneous state, he nonetheless 
interpreted the historical events that followed the French Revolution as consistent with 
the progression towards the universal and homogeneous state.  
It is remarkable that Derrida concurred with Kojève at some level on the basis for 
present and future political projects: the classical emancipatory ideal exemplified in the 
French Declaration of Rights of Man.4 We should also observe with Caygill that, “There 
is a sense in which Levinas believed that the declaration of the Rights of Man marked a 
partial and fragile realization of the universal vocation of Israel, one that needed to be 
deepened, especially with respect to the notion of fraternity.”5 As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the universal vocation of Israel pertains to prophetic politics; and within 
this context, it should become clear through the course of this chapter that the political 
project of developing the universal and homogeneous state can be grounded upon 
Levinasian ethics.  
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From Kojève’s ironic perspective, the United States represented the model for 
homogeneity for the universal and homogeneous state. As mentioned in Chapter II, 
Kojève became somewhat dismissive of the world-historical import of the universal and 
homogeneous state after he separated its realization from the event of the end of history 
(if the earlier Kojève’s thought is characteristically Marxist, we can say that the later 
Kojève’s thought is better characterized as existentialist rather than post-Marxist, as we 
shall see). 
With this homogeneity realized in America, all that seemingly remained was the 
expansion / universalization of the American model: 
One can even say that, form a certain point of view, the United States has 
already attained the final stage of Marxist “communism,” seeing that, 
practically, all the members of a “classless society” can from now on 
appropriate for themselves that seems good to them, without thereby 
working any more than their heart dictates. . . . the “American way of life” 
was the type of life specific to the post-historical period, the actual 
presence of the United States in the World prefiguring the “eternal 
present” future of all humanity. Thus, Man’s return to animality appeared 
no longer as a possibility that was yet to come, but as a certainty that was 
already present.6   
 
Kojève goes on in this footnote to remark how he revised his opinion upon his visit to 
Japan, where post-historical civilization developed life-forms or “ways diametrically 
opposed”7 to American animalism. Specifically, it was the Japanese devotion to formality 
and custom, or “Snobbery,”8 inherited from their nobility that impressed Kojève as 
“anything but animal.”9   
At this point, one may well throw her hands up in exasperation at such 
soothsaying generalizations and stereotypes; however, while these footnote reflections on 
Japan and the United States cannot be taken too seriously, they serve as more than mere 
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provocations. Nichols notes that rather than taking Kojève too literally, one should read 
Kojève invoking:  
two ideal types . . . I suppose that he has in mind traits of the American 
way of life” that have provoked keen comments from observers at least as 
early as Tocqueville: a preference for fast and easy satisfaction, a kind of 
informality or even formlessness, an impatience with tradition . . .. Now, 
ideal types do not exist actually in their purity.”10  
 
Of course, the American “ideal” is something of an oxymoron, if we take such an ideal to 
be the very repudiation of ideal life-forms. While neither the Japanese nor the American 
“ideals” of the end of history should be taken seriously in their purity, one must admit 
that these ideals pertain to a certain question of purity. As Derrida puts it, “There where 
man, a certain determined concept of man, is finished, there the pure humanity of man, of 
the other man and of man as other begins or has finally the chance of heralding itself – of 
promising itself.”11  It is precisely this opposition between formalism and formlessness 
that Derrida reads as even containing a moral imperative when Kojève says:  
To remain human, Man must remain a “subject opposed to the Object,” 
even if “Action negating the given and Error” disappears. This means that, 
while henceforth speaking in an adequate fashion of everything that is 
given to him, post-historical Man must [droit] continue to detach “form” 
from “content,” doing so no longer in order actively to transform the latter, 
but so that he may oppose himself as a pure “form” to himself and to 
others taken as “content” of any sort.12 
 
In one form forming another, we have a portrait of Levinas’s conception of mastery. We 
should note that whereas the Hegelian master opposes herself as form to the slave as 
content for the dialectical trans-formation of the slave, the Levinasian master opposes 
herself to a student capable of being in-formed with the idea of perfection.13 Derrida 
comments that the word “droit” in Kojève’s text is both a promise and a prescription for 
something infinitely beyond in some sense:  
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Apparently “formalist,” this indifference to the content has perhaps the 
value of giving one to think the necessarily pure and the purely necessary 
form of the future as such, in its being-necessarily-promised, prescribed, 
assigned, enjoined, in the necessarily formal necessity of its possibility – 
in short, in its law. It is this law that dislodges any present out of its 
contemporaneity with itself. Whether the promise promises this or that, 
whether it be fulfilled or not, or whether it be unfulfillable, there is 
necessarily some promise and therefore some historicity as future-to-
come. It is what we are nicknaming the messianic without messianism.14 
 
What is central to Derrida’s reading of Kojève’s notion of Japanese formalism is that 
such formalism is itself an ethics or a rediscovery of ethics that announces itself as an 
ethical imperative within Kojève’s thoughts on the existential prospects of post-historical 
humanity.  
 It is by this means of Japanization that Jewish universalism can avoid the total 
assimilation of Jewish faith communities into secular pluralism. As a prerequisite for the 
process of Japanization, Americanization creates the conditions whereby people can be 
treated as indifferent content. If so, the moral imperative for realizing Japanization also 
holds for Americanization. Counter-intuitively, we could say that Japanization is akin to 
the metaphysical atheism / egoism required before the Self’s ethical encounter with the 
Other qua Americanization. Nonetheless, it is precisely the formation of particular and 
distinctive communities that seems characteristic of what Kojève refers to as snobbism.  
With reference to Kojève’s controversial sociopolitical commentary on the total 
homogenization and satiation of American life, Nichols observes: 
Perhaps too, Kojève was expressing here a point of view that has been 
taken over the years by many philosophers and other intellectuals from 
Socrates, Diogenes the Cynic, and Epicureans among the ancients to 
Rousseau, Marx and John Stuart Mill among the moderns: if people are 
able to have all the things that the philosopher in question considers 
enough for them (meeting their real needs and providing all the genuine 
satisfactions of which they are in fact capable), these people must properly 
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be understood to have all that they want (or at least can reasonably 
want).15  
 
If we read Americanization with Derrida as, “the cancellation of the gap between desire 
and need”16 and Japanization as the cultivation of desire (for form, the Forms if you will, 
or the Good beyond the content of being) beyond bare need through the master/student 
relationship, Nichols’s observation is most insightful for distinguishing between 
Levinas’s and Hegel’s differing notions of desire.   
 Hegel’s conception of desire as desire for the other’s desire (or pure prestige) is 
relevant for Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of instrumental reason as insatiable in its 
desire for dominating everything from nature to desire itself. At the end of history, desire 
for recognition should be fully satiated in the universal citizenship that supersedes the 
master/slave relationship. If instrumental reason is indeed an outgrowth of the slave’s 
relationship with nature, what happens to humanity’s relationship to nature and 
instrumental reason once humanity has surpassed the age of slavery? In theory, such an 
end of history marks the full satiation of desire for recognition, but what is to prevent the 
total animalization of post-historical humanity as the inexorable desire for recognition is 
displaced onto bare animal need? This is surely the risk of Americanization. 
I believe that Levinas's conception of desire offers a paradigm for the limitless 
aspect of human appetite. Post-historical humanity risks reverting to the lack of self-
consciousness characteristic of bourgeois mastery in conflating desire with need. This 
conflation creates the impression that freedom is the Americanized pursuit of happiness 
in feeding one's needs based on a lack considered to be insatiable, a la desire. This 
reversion seems to be depicted in Horkheimer and Adorno’s interpretation of Odysseus’ 
encounter with the Sirens in the Dialectic of Enlightenment. If the Sirens can be signified 
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as the wholly Other, Horkheimer and Adorno portray universal emancipation as a 
radically transformed humanity; and if so, there is a resonance with Levinasian ethics 
where genuine desire for the Other is unshackled from bare need through instrumental 
reason’s subjugation to practical reason. 
As mentioned in Chapter II, the Cartesian reduction of mind to a thinking thing 
casts the mind as an instrument in some respect. From the self-possession of the cogito 
and the reification of the mind, we can see how instrumental reason hijacks the 
emancipatory potential of enlightenment reasoning. Descartes leaves both Hegel and 
Levinas in suspense at this point. Both must configure desire within the ego to carry it out 
of its isolated and self-identical self-presence. For Hegel, desire is the birth of self-
consciousness from bare consciousness, and the anthropogenesis of self-consciousness 
leads to a tragic totality in the end of history as reviewed in Chapter II. For Levinas, 
desire for the Other grounds the finitude of the ego and provides a formal basis for an 
ethics of the Other.  
   In fact, it is precisely after this first Cartesian premise essential to modern 
philosophy, that Hegel's philosophy, through the desire for prestige, branches towards 
consummated wisdom and Levinas’s philosophy branches towards the wisdom of love.17 
By way of metaphor, we can represent this philosophical divergence through Homer's 
Odyssey in Odysseus's dramatic self-conflict between continuing homeward for the 
consummation of his love with Penelope and allowing himself to pursue the absolute 
otherness of the Sirens in the compelling infinity by which the Sirens overwhelm 
Odysseus's presence of mind.   
The art of the Sirens’ song evokes a mythic and idyllic past that overpowers:  
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No one who hears their song can escape. Humanity had to inflict terrible 
injuries on itself before the self – the identical, purpose-directed, 
masculine character of human beings – was created, and something of this 
process is repeated in every childhood. The effort to hold itself together 
attends the ego at all its stages, and the temptation to be rid of the ego has 
always gone hand-in-hand with the blind determination to preserve it.18 
 
The Sirens pose an unparalleled opportunity for Odysseus: a chance for a total 
unburdening and escape from his destined homecoming. For Levinas, Odysseus also 
represents this effort of the ego to “hold itself together.” With reference to the 
henological tradition of Parmenides, Spinoza and Hegel, Levinas notes that this tradition 
posits the time of a separated being’s return, “to its metaphysical source, a moment of a 
history that will be concluded by union, metaphysics would be an Odyssey, and its 
disquietude nostalgia.”19 Additionally, “Ruse and ambush – Ulysses’ [Odysseus’] craft – 
constitute the essence of war,”20 and so the Greek Odysseus represents the Western 
political tradition of conflict resolution by means of annihilation. Nostalgia for reunion 
proving to be his ultimate motivation to the point of madness, Odysseus’s means of ruse 
and ambush are exercised in their fullest against the suitors of his wife Penelope upon 
Odysseus’ return home after his encounter with the Sirens. This serves as a metaphor for 
a metaphysics where the Same is disquieted in its need for the resolution of its 
indifference to the other. Levinas opposes this metaphysics with his own where the Same 
is disquieted in the non-indifferent absolution of its desire for the other. 
In the encounter with the Sirens, Odysseus places the ruse on himself and 
ambushes his own desire. On a Levinasian reading, perhaps the Sirens represent the 
innermost desire for all existents to escape existence for the sake of the Other beyond any 
need for lack. For Adorno and Horkheimer, the Sirens represent: 
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The fear of losing the self, and suspending with it the boundary between 
oneself and other life, the aversion to death and destruction, is twinned 
with a promise of joy which has threatened civilization at every moment. 
The way of civilization has been that of obedience and work, over which 
fulfillment shines everlastingly as mere illusion, as beauty deprived of 
power.21 
 
History’s path is forged by the technological advances born of unsatiated need. The 
Western philosophical tradition is marked by a compulsion to reduce the other to the 
same just as history strives to reduce all desire to that which is manageable through the 
technological advances of work: need. Odysseus commands his comrades to stuff their 
ears while having his self tied to the mast so that he may listen to the Sirens’ song where 
he discovers a desire even more primordial than that of his nostalgic need for home: 
Society has always made sure that this was the case. Workers must look 
ahead with alert concentration and ignore anything which lies to one side. 
The urge toward distraction must be grimly sublimated in redoubled 
exertions. Thus the works are made practical . . . the landowner . . . listens, 
but does so while bound helplessly to the mast, and the stronger the 
allurement grows the more tightly he has himself bound, just as later the 
bourgeois denied themselves happiness the closer it drew to them with the 
increase in their own power . . . The bonds by which he has irrevocably 
fettered himself to praxis at the same time keep the Sirens at a distance 
from praxis: their lure is neutralized as a mere object of contemplation, as 
art. The fettered man listens to a concert, as immobilized as audiences 
later, and his enthusiastic call for liberation goes unheard as applause.22 
 
Odysseus’ comrades are deaf to his expressions. As they work side-to-side, they do not 
behold the face of the Sirens, their master or even each other. Analogously, the 
materialist infrastructure of society can absolutely restrain one from the Other as 
neighbor in the strictest regulation of desire. For Odysseus, the Sirens pose the danger of 
transforming his odyssey of dogged need into an eternal sojourn of desire: a betrayal of 
home, family and self. Odysseus’ comrades cannot know what Odysseus is raving about 
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as they are under command to confine their desires homeward bound as they keep to 
themselves. 
Odysseus is thrilled by the spectacle of the Sirens, but the last thing he can enjoy 
is his own self as the egoism of his self-identity is warped into a complete loss of self. 
Odysseus is commanded by the Sirens. In turn, Odysseus issues commands to his 
comrades to loosen his bonds, but he has willed himself into a position where he is 
incapable of self-command, “Those at the top experience the existence with which they 
no longer need to concern themselves as a mere substrate, and are wholly ossified as the 
self which issues commands.”23 Only those “at the top” can appreciate the distinction 
between need and desire in their complete egoism; yet, it is also they who are the only 
ones not at home with themselves, since they are disabused of the illusion that their desire 
could ever be fulfilled. 
In terms of ethical demand, we can say that the demand that Odysseus faces in his 
openness to the Sirens is compelling to the point of sacrificing his own family and home. 
Odysseus cannot turn his face from the Sirens - he must acquiesce to the infinite demand 
of the Sirens. We can admit the difference between the moral phenomenology of the 
Other and the immemorial origin that commands an ethical response in the face of the 
Other on the basis of an extra-historical identity or primordial covenant on the order of 
the eschatological. As referenced in Chapter III, Perpich offers a moral phenomenology 
of the Other in arguing that the moral skeptic ultimately falls into a performative 
contradiction when contesting the moral phenomenology of the Other: 
The would-be amoralist asks for proof or evidence that the other is his 
concern: “What is my brother to me or I to him that I should concern 
myself with his welfare?” The skeptic effectively demands a reason that 
would justify the other’s demand for care or concern. In so doing, the 
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skeptic implicates herself in the very practices of reflection that indicate 
just the sort of relation she would like to deny. That is, the skeptic uses a 
faculty or practice granted to her by the social or ethical relationship in 
order to question whether such a relation could really be attributed to her. 
Her question thus involves her in a performative contradiction . . .”24 
 
Nonetheless, despite performative contradiction, what can force or compel the moral 
skeptic to moral action in the face of a lack of reason for responding to the demand of the 
Other? As Levinas notes, “Responsibility is anterior to all the logical deliberation 
summoned by reasoned decision. Deliberation would already be the reduction of the face 
of the Other to a representation, to the objectivity of the visible, to its compelling force, 
which belongs to the world.”25 Therefore, while societal practices and norms might 
involve the moral skeptic in a performative contradiction, such practices and norms are 
not, in any event, the ultimate grounds of responsibility for Levinas. The anteriority of 
responsibility is:  
an-archic . . . It is the significance of a past that concerns me, that “regards 
me,” and is “my business” outside of all reminiscence, re-tension, re-
presentation, or reference to a remembered past. . . . Such is my 
nonintentional participation in the history of humanity, in the past of 
others, who “regard me.” The dia-chrony of a past that does not gather 
into re-presentation is at the bottom of the concreteness of the time that is 
the time of my responsibility for the Other.26 
 
In this sense, the formless ground of responsibility beyond representation could serve as 
the skeptic’s reason for theoretically denying the ethical demand of the Other. 
Regardless, the face of the other is a channel (such as the idea of infinity) through which 
the time immemorial of eschatology (the infinite, the invisible, the stranger and the Third 
Party) necessitates and compels the skeptic’s moral involvement in spite of his or her 
(ir)rational protests.  
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In a sense the primordiality and anarchy of the Other’s commandment is 
represented in the absolutely mythic and timeless Sirens. They represent an empowered 
art that compels desire towards action, involvement and praxis:  
Their allurement is that of losing oneself in the past . . . The urge to rescue 
the past as something living, instead of using it as the material of progress, 
has been satisfied only in art, in which even history, as a representation of 
past life, is included. As long as art does not insist on being treated as 
knowledge, and thus exclude itself from praxis, it is tolerated by social 
praxis in the same way as pleasure. But the Sirens’ song has not yet been 
deprived of power as art.27 
 
In this metaphor, we have a notion of how the emancipatory political philosophy of 
Horkheimer and Adorno can be articulated vis-à-vis Levinas in a prophetic politics that 
first exposes the difference between need and desire and then cultivates desire on the 
basis of satiating need. This discussion on the necessitating moral power of time 
immemorial will prove relevant to the question of fraternity in relation to Žižek’s 
criticisms of Levinas’s notion of the neighbor. In a manner, Žižek’s argument resembles 
the Marxist dismissal of ethics as a super-structural effect of the fundamental economic 
forces; yet, Žižek’s psychoanalytical, Marxist criticism of Levinas provide me an 
opportunity to defend my thesis as Žižek’s argument is essentially in direct contradiction 
with my thesis.   
 As referenced earlier in this chapter, Levinas took the deepening of fraternity to 
be especially pertinent to the “universal vocation of Israel,”28 in its representation of the 
eschatological order. Žižek addresses this theme in his essay “Neighbors and other 
Monsters: a Plea for Ethical Violence.”29 In some sense, Žižek construes Levinas’s notion 
of justice as a context-sensitive deontology open to understanding any party as the Other. 
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In this manner, Žižek claims, Levinas leaves himself vulnerable to a blind pacifism in the 
potential justification of any actor, no matter how evil.  
 To contextualize Žižek’s essay, Žižek associates Levinas’s concept of the Other 
with the symbolic “big Other,” in Lacan’s thought.30 Žižek describes the symbolic Other 
(in contradistinction to the real Other and the imaginary Other) as “the “substance” of our 
social existence, the impersonal set of rules that coordinate our coexistence.”31 It is from 
this association that Žižek errs in a manner similar to Perpich in grounding the self-other 
ethical relation on present-standing societal conventions and norms. What proceeds from 
this error is a number of exegetical premises that falsely characterize Levinas’s 
philosophy.    
 After this characterization of Levinas’s Other as the symbolic “big Other,” Žižek 
writes: 
We should therefore assume the risk of countering Levinas’s position with 
a more radical one: others are primordially an (ethically) indifferent 
multitude, and love is a violent gesture of cutting into this multitude and 
privileging a One as the neighbor, thus introducing a radical imbalance 
into the whole. In contrast to love, justice begins when I remember the 
faceless many left in shadow in this privileging of the One. Justice and 
love are thus structurally incompatible: justice, not love, has to be blind; it 
must disregard the privileged One whom I “really understand.” What this 
means is that the Third is not secondary: it is always-already here, and the 
primordial ethical obligation is toward this Third who is not here in the 
face-to-face relationship, the one in the shadow, like the absent child of a 
love-couple.32 
 
There are a number of mischaracterizations of Levinas’s thought that follow from Žižek’s 
neglect for the role of infinitude in the ethical interrelationship. First, I doubt that the 
Other can ever be “really understood” on Levinas’s terms. The only way the Other can be 
a condition of my finitude is through the Other’s infinitude beyond comprehension or 
realization. Such as the idea of infinity, the Other can never be “really” understood just as 
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the idea of infinity can never be contained – the Other, such as the idea of infinity, 
overflows the understanding. It is through the singular Other that the infinity of the Third 
Party and time immemorial claims me, “The third party looks at me in the eyes of the 
Other – language is justice. . . . The presence of the face, the infinity of the other, is a 
destituteness, a presence of the third party (that is, of the whole of humanity which looks 
at us), and a command that commands commanding.”33  
As Žižek uses the term, “justice” is political justice or justice as it pertains to the 
Third Party; however, the Self does not autonomously choose one Other out of the many 
in an unjust act of love on Žižek’s reading. Rather, it is the singular Other (out of the 
many) that chooses me in my heteronomy. Nonetheless, it is on this assumption of the 
self’s autonomy in relation to the Other that Žižek then argues: 
This brings us to the radical anti-Levinasian conclusion: the true ethical 
step is the one beyond the face of the other, the one of suspending the hold 
of the face, the one of choosing against the face, for the third. This 
coldness is justice at its most elementary. Every preempting of the Other 
in the guise of his or her face relegates the Third to the faceless 
background. And the elementary gesture of justice is not to show respect 
for the face in front of me, to be open to its depth, but to abstract from it 
and refocus onto the faceless Thirds in the background. It is only such a 
shift of focus onto the Third that effectively uproots justice, liberating it 
from the contingent umbilical link that renders it “embedded” in a 
particular situation. In other words, it is only such a shift onto the Third 
that grounds justice in the dimension of universality proper.34  
 
In a sense, to give up on the Other is to give up on the possibility of education in the 
master/student rapport, but from where would we learn the idea of justice and the idea of 
the other Others (the Third Party) if not from the face of the Other?  
 Furthermore, the Other cannot speak to the Self unless it is on the behalf of the 
Third party. Otherwise, the Self / Other relationship is merely an I / Thou relationship 
without need for discourse; therefore, the discourse of justice is based on an ethics of the 
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Other insofar as the Other is commanded by the infinite humanity of the Third party. 
Reaching past the Neighbor for the sake of the Third as Žižek characterizes justice is the 
concrete, deformalized analogue of dismissing the idea of infinity, which Levinas takes to 
be infinity’s mode of being or “infinition.”35 
Certainly infinity itself logically precedes the idea of infinity, but the ego does not 
first relate to infinity to later construct or imagine an idea of positive infinity. Yet, Žižek 
nonetheless argues that one’s relationship with the third party precedes the relationship 
with the Other: 
Prior to encountering the Other as a face in front of us, the Other is here as 
a paradoxical background-face; in other words, the first relationship to an 
Other is that to a faceless Third. The Third is a formal-transcendental fact; 
it is not that, while, in our empirical lives, the Third is irreducible, we 
should maintain as a kind of regulative Idea the full grounding of ethics in 
the relationship to the Other’s Face. Such a grounding is not only 
empirically impossible, it is a priori impossible, since the limitation of our 
capacity to relate to Others’ faces is the mark of our very finitude. In other 
words, the limitation of our ethical relation of responsibility toward the 
Other’s face which necessitates the rise of the Third (the domain of 
regulations) is a positive condition of ethics, not simply its secondary 
supplement. If we deny this – in other words, if we stick to the postulate of 
a final translatability of the Third into a relation to the Other’s face – we 
remain caught in the vicious cycle of “understanding.” One can 
“understand” everything; even the most hideous crime has an “inner truth 
and beauty” when observed from within . . .36 
 
Although Levinas would agree that the Self’s relation to the Other is marked by finitude, 
this does not preclude an ethics grounded on the relationship to the Other. While the third 
party could be conceded as an a priori fact, the relationship to the Other is prior to any 
transcendental fact analytically deduced from a subject’s a priori cognition. Levinas 
notes, “The responsibility for the Other signified as an order in the neighbor’s face is not, 
in me, the simple modality of “transcendental apperception.” The order concerns me 
without it being possible for me to go back to the thematic presence of a being that would 
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be the cause or the willing of this commandment.”37 Therefore, Žižek is incorrect to say 
that the relationship to the third party is prior to the relationship to the Other.  
For Žižek, the justice that prioritizes the third party over the Other is all the more 
just in its blindness, “Thus, truly blind justice cannot be grounded in the relationship to 
the Other’s face, in other words, in the relationship to the neighbor. Justice is 
emphatically not justice for – with regard to – the neighbor.”38 As an example of justice 
that transcends the neighbor, Zizek references Che Guevara lauding hatred in warfare for 
the love of humanity,39 but if one sees the exploitation of the Stranger, the widow or the 
orphan, it seems that one is all the more compelled and necessitated to intervene by 
whatever means necessary precisely on behalf of the Other through whom one visualizes 
the invisible third party. For example, Zizek neglects the moment when a person (say, 
Che Guevara in this context) is inspired, in the face of an Other who happens to be a 
revolutionary on behalf of the third party (let us say provisionally, Fidel Castro), to join 
the revolution as the revolutionary's neighbor and comrade. 
Furthermore, justice does not need to be blind if its object (the Third Party) is 
invisible. To make the third party apparent, the singularity of the Other must be amplified 
and appreciated in its priority to the third party. For Levinas, justice is a discourse with 
the Other concerning the third party40 while the law concerns the conditions for equality 
between the self and the third; yet Žižek seems to reduce justice (in its virtuous 
blindness) to the immutable law in a collapsing of religion and politics where the only 
foundation for ethics is the irreducible and arbitrary law, “When Levinas endeavors to 
ground ethics in the Other’s face, is he not still clinging to the ultimate root of the ethical 
commitment, afraid to accept the abyss of the rootless Law as the only foundation of 
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ethics?”41 Yet Levinas observes the separation between religion and politics as a 
condition for a politics of equality:  
[T]he distance that separates happiness from desire separates politics from 
religion. Politics tends toward reciprocal recognition, that is, toward 
equality; it ensures happiness. And political law concludes and sanctions 
the struggle for recognition. Religion is Desire and not struggle for 
recognition. It is the surplus possible in a society of equals, that of 
glorious humility, responsibility, and sacrifice, which are the condition for 
equality itself.42  
 
In asserting one’s unquestioned autonomy to refuse the Other for the sake of the 
third party in the name of the Law, Žižek makes an idealist identification between reason 
and the will that ultimately “reduces ethics to politics”43 in Levinas’s words. In Kant’s 
practical philosophy, one does not act freely unless rationally. This is why Kant’s ethical 
system is to be considered essentially a political system in its abstract, categorical 
orientation to any hypothetical third party.  
Rather than asserting the immutability of a rootless and blind law, Derrida 
distinguishes justice as a deconstructive element within law for the law’s continual 
revision, development and refinement: 
Politicization, for example, is interminable even if it cannot and should not 
ever be total. . . . One cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether 
crudely or with sophistication, with at least some thoughtlessness and 
without forming the worst complicities. It is true that it is also necessary to 
re-elaborate, without renouncing, the concept of emancipation, 
enfranchisement, or liberation while taking into account the strange 
structures we have been describing. But beyond these identified territories 
of juridico-politicization on the grand geo-political scale, beyond all self-
serving misappropriations and hijackings, beyond all determined and 
particular reappropriations of international law, other areas must 
constantly open up that can at first resemble secondary or marginal 
areas.44 
 
As I understand it, politicization involves the perpetual reduction of ethics to 
politics while the Other eternally generates new ethical responsibilities on the basis of the 
             69
Other’s singularity. I will submit that my reading of Levinas entails that the Self is 
obliged, by the command of the Other, to (politically) eliminate the conditions for the 
proliferation of the Third party qua stranger. To strive for the elimination of these 
conditions seems obligatory for the project of enhancing fraternity. The total elimination 
of the third party qua stranger would constitute the homogeneity of all content, as we 
have heretofore referred to it. This ethical project of politicization would entail the legal 
codification of ethics conceived through the idealism of the anonymous, hypothetical 
third, since Levinas takes such ethics to be essentially political rather than ethical. Contra 
blind justice, this process of politicization would lead to laws that are increasingly 
sensitive to the singularity of the Other.  
In some sense, if the Third Party qua stranger vanishes completely, the Self / 
Other relationship would resemble the I / Thou relationship devoid of meaningful 
discourse: the language of the I / Thou relationship is a reversion to “laughter and 
cooing,”45 whereas the I / Other relationship constitutes language around a third party 
where, “The third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other – language is justice.”46 Such 
a state of affairs devoid of the third party’s destitution would resemble the homogeneity 
of the universal and homogeneous state as Kojève conceived of it; yet, as Derrida argued 
above, the animalized content of an Americanized end of history is not the end of the 
story. Homogeneity implies a consistency or equality of content, but by way of the 
formalist indifference to content, the animalization of the I / Thou relationship can be 
prevented. Along these lines, Levinas writes:  
within the very interiority hollowed out by enjoyment there must be 
produced a heteronomy that incites to another destiny than this animal 
complacency in oneself. . . . The happiness of enjoyment is stronger than 
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every disquietude, but disquietude can trouble it; here lies the gap between 
the animal and the human.47 
 
Therefore, the absolute homogenization of post-historical society is not a 
necessity. Justice can retain its essential place in language through the indifference to 
content characteristic of Kojève’s understanding of Japanization. So long as an 
indifference to content can be maintained, politicization is interminable in the teaching 
and self-mastery of Japanization. Returning to Derrida’s reading of Kojève, the end of 
history does not result in the elimination of all content, but merely the homogenization of 
all content characteristic of a universal and homogeneous state. The Japanese indifference 
to content “therefore conditions the interest in and not the indifference to anything 
whatsoever . . . Without it, there would be neither intention, nor need, nor desire, and so 
on.”48 The idea of justice, and hence language by Levinas’s definition, can perdure 
through an interminable politicization based on an idea of justice: 
[I]f there is a deconstruction of all presumption to a determining certainty 
of a present justice, it itself operates on the basis of an “idea of justice” 
that is infinite, infinite because irreducible, irreducible because owed to 
the other – owed to the other, before any contract, because it has come, it 
is a coming [parce qu’elle est venue], the coming of the other as always 
other singularity.49 
 
The idea of justice (as with the idea of infinity) must be singular rather than particular, 
since the singular is incomparable and beyond the order of universal/particular. To 
reiterate, while politicization brings a particular, thematized ethics into a universal, 
political order, these particular, thematized ethics are in turn grounded in a singular, pre-
thematic ethics, properly so called. This would constitute the progressive politicization of 
ethics. This is akin to the “messianic without messianism,” wherein no one system of 
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law, politics or “justice” could ever do full justice to that which motivates politicization 
in the singularity of the Other. Regarding the various messianic contents, Derrida notes: 
I would hesitate to assimilate too quickly this “idea of justice” to a 
regulative idea in the Kantian sense, to whatever content of a messianic 
promise (I say content and not form, for any messianic form, any 
messianicity, is never absent from a promise, whatever promise it is) or to 
other horizons of the same type. An I am only speaking of a type, of the 
type of horizon the kinds [espèce] of which would be numerous and 
competing . . . The singularity of the historical place . . . allows us a 
glimpse of the type itself, as the origin, condition, possibility or promise of 
all its exemplifications (messianism or determinate messianic figures of 
the Jewish, Christian or Islamic type, idea in the Kantian sense, eschato-
teleology of the neo-Hegelian type, Marxist or post-Marxist, etc.)50 
 
We can say the desire for a messianic content (a messianism) is really nothing aside from 
a metaphysical need for the end of history. The law of the messianic without messianism 
(not to be confused with any legal content or the law in general in Derrida’s thought) 
“dislodges any present out of its contemporaneity with itself.”51 
In Derrida’s distinguishing the idea of justice from the regulative idea of Kantian 
practical philosophy, we must admit a certain messianism in Kant’s postulating the 
existence of God for the sake of securing the possibility of the highest good. Levinas 
claimed that the Declaration of the Rights of Man was a partial realization of the 
universal vocation of Israel.52 If so, then would the full elaboration and politicization of 
the Rights of Man result in the messianic fulfillment of the vocation of Israel? Regarding 
the content of messianism, Levinas’s seems to leave open the possibility of a messianism 
without content in the concluding sentences of Totality and Infinity, “Truth requires both 
an infinite time and a time it will be able to seal, a completed time. The completing of 
time is not death, but messianic time, where the perpetual is converted into eternal. . . . Is 
this eternity a new structure of time, or an extreme vigilance of the messianic 
             72
consciousness?”53 In short, it seems that messianic fulfillment of the vocation of Israel is 
an impossibility given the infinity of the vocation and the infinite promise of the call. 
Derrida refers to the infinite promise as being, “always untenable at least for the reason 
that it calls for the infinite respect of the singularity and infinite alterity of the other as 
much as for the respect of the countable, calculable, subjectal equality between 
anonymous singularities.”54  
It is odd to think of the prophetic call as commanding one to infinite responsibility 
for a project as grand and overwhelming as the realization of the universal and 
homogeneous state, but how can any one universalistic project be as overwhelming as the 
infinite responsibility of being chosen by the Other? And while the heterogeneous and 
singular self is called to be a force for homogenization, it is perhaps within this infinite, 
unappeasable responsibility in being chosen that one can locate the final assurance and 
promise against the dangers of total assimilation.  
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CHAPTER V  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 Insofar as the universal and homogeneous state is synonymous with the end of 
history, it cannot be a goal of eschatology; however, because Kojève revised his 
conception of the end of history as a past event wholly distinct from the universal and 
homogeneous state, we can see how the universal and homogeneous state can serve as a 
promise consistent with the realization of universal rights. If we grant Kojève the end of 
history, Hegelian conceptions of desire and mastery are passé even in light of humanity’s 
rediscovery of itself through the process of Japanization; however, Japanization allows 
for a rediscovery of human form consistent with the Levinasian conceptions of desire and 
mastery. In the existentialist imperative to formalize humanity, the danger of assimilation 
by the mass-homogenization of Americanization is circumvented. 
While the order of the eschatological is not antithetical to homogenization per se, 
the eschatological promise, or the messianic with messianism, is inherently anti-tragic in 
its reference to infinity. While tragedy would annihilate the hero to maintain the narrative 
wholeness of history, Levinas posits the order of the eschatological that would sooner 
destroy the whole narrative of history to preserve the singularity.  
 This puts Hölderlin’s anti-cartesianism into a fuller perspective. I have argued that 
Hölderlin rejected Descartes’ foundationalism as irrelevant for any genuine intuition into 
undifferentiated and absolute being; however, perhaps it is the second movement of 
Descartes’ reflection that Hölderlin would find even more antithetical to the sense of 
undifferentiated being disclosed in tragedy. Instead of a hidden or withdrawn God, the 
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idea of the infinite manifestly reveals God in the infinition of the idea of the infinite. In 
this uncontainable idea of the infinite, the totality of the cogito is defaced along with any 
genuine notion of totality that is inseparable from all of being, and it is precisely the 
notion of totality that Hölderlin’s theory of the tragedy is contingent upon. 
But the notion of promise conceived by Derrida as the messianic without 
messianism is always a promise of non-annihilation. If this is so, then even the promise 
of annihilation is a promise that one is lying, which perhaps invokes the narrative of 
Abraham and Isaac. It is the singularity that is chosen from outside of history for the 
great responsibility of realizing the prophetic politics of universal rights. This singularity 
is not called to create a whole or a totality, but rather to correspond with the idea of the 
infinite produced by the wholly Other. In this corresponding with the eschatological 
order, the singularity of the Other is preserved from tragic finality. This correspondence 
itself is the infinite work of justice whereby discourse, humanity and singularity are 
preserved.
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